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Abstract
As the growth of donor funding for HIV/AIDS begins to slow and the increasing
burden of non-communicable diseases forces funders and policy makers to reassess
health systems priorities – it is important to understand the most efficient way to
allocate scarce health resources. The aim of this PhD thesis is to investigate whether
the activities of global donors improved the efficiency of HIV programmes from a
global perspective. This thesis will use a case study approach to focus on three key
activities of global donors in the HIV treatment process: harm reduction, HIV testing
and drug procurement.
This thesis will provide empirical evidence on the cost effectiveness of harm
reductive in the Ukraine, the equity of HIV testing in Malawi, and the efficiency of
centralising procurement of HIV drugs at the international level. Each theme is
explored using a single country case study. Research methods exploit widely
available datasets not yet used to answer these questions. Each chapter describes
the methods used for the analyses i.e., Markov Monte-Carlo simulation, a
decomposed concentration index and difference-in-difference analysis.
The findings of these analyses are as follows; Chapter 2 concludes that the harm
reduction programme in the Ukraine is cost effective in terms of QALYs gained and
infections averted. Chapter 3 demonstrates that existing inequity in HIV testing has
been reduced and highlights how socio economic factors such as income, education
and gender influence inequity in HIV testing in Malawi. Chapter 4 shows that
voluntary pooled procurement can effectively reduce the procurement price of an
HIV drug.
Given these findings, this thesis suggests that strategies adopted by global donors
have improved the efficiency of HIV care in these contexts.
Dissemination of the thesis
• Chapter 2: ‘CEA of harm reduction interventions in the Ukraine’ was
published in Cost effectiveness and resource allocation: Kim et al. (2014),
Comparing the cost effectiveness of harm reduction strategies: a case
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1 Introduction
11.1 Introduction
The Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) and Acquired Immunodeficiency
Syndrome (AIDS) have been a major priority for global donors for over a decade.
The emergence of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria
(GFATM) in 2002, and the US President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief
(PEPFAR) in 2003, have supported the global response to HIV/AIDS (1).
The main source of financial support for HIV prevention and treatment, particularly
in resource limited countries, include multilateral institutions, bilateral agencies, non-
government organisations and public private partnerships (2). Multilateral institutions
include the World Bank and UN agencies such as UNICEF and WHO. Bilateral
agencies are linked to national governments and include the U.S Agency for
International Development (USAID) and U.K Department for International
Development (DFID) (2). Public private partnerships in this context are commonly
also known as global health initiatives (GHIs). In addition to conventional global
donors, global health initiatives (GHIs) have emerged since 2000 (3). Global health
initiatives (GHIs) can be defined as ‘a blueprint for financing, resourcing,
coordinating and/or implementing disease control across at least several countries in
more than one region of the world’ (4). This term generally includes four major global
donors; the World Bank, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria
(GFATM), the US President’s Emergency Plan For AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and the
Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI) (3) although other
organisations may be included.
This variety of donors has increased global health funding and particularly,
resources for the global HIV response (5). The GFATM scaled up funding for HIV
programmes globally from 1% of total support for health in 2002, to 8.3% of total
support in 2007 (6). The budgeted totals of GFATM HIV spending were US$ 16
million for Round 1 in 2002, but increased to US$ 135 million for Round 10 in 2010
(7). Similarly, PEPFAR invested US$ 81 million and US$ 89 million for HIV
2programmes in Zambia and South Africa, respectively, in 2004 and that funding
was increased to US$ 266 million and US$ 546 million in 2009, respectively (8).
Between 1999 and 2009, GAVI received approximately US$ 3.8 billion for vaccine
programmes including HIV but it was merely US$ 2 million in 2000 only (9). Since
2000 the Multi-Country HIV/AIDS programme (MAP), which is implemented by the
World Bank for Africa, raised up to US$1.2 billion compared with the first phase of
$ 500 million between 1987 to 1997 (10). These examples are good evidence that
GHIs have successfully raised large amounts of funding to support the global HIV
response – with positive implications for HIV care.
The significant expansion of HIV financing enabled a great number of people to
receive antiretroviral therapy (ART) in 2015. Since 2000, the World Bank delivered
ART to approximately 2 million adults and children living with HIV (11). As of
September 2011, the ‘US Presidents’ Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR)’
directly supported ART for 3.9 million patients worldwide (12). In 2014
approximately 40 % of people living with HIV can receive ARV whereas less than
1 % of people could have access to HIV treatment in 2000 (13). Approximately
nine millions of people living with HIV are being supported ART through
programmes by GFATM in 2016 while the number of people on ART was less than
1 million in 2004 (14). Clearly, the number of people accessing ART has increased
with the funding of the GHIs.
Despite progress in improving access, achieving universal access to HIV
treatment remains a major concern in terms of global health. In 2015, the rate of
coverage for ART was less than 50 % of 35 million HIV infected, and 1.1 million
people are newly infected with HIV globally (15). This means that more than 18
million of HIV infected people are living without access to ART treatment.
Approximately 23% of pregnant women living with HIV are exposed to a risk of
HIV transmission to their babies due to the absence of ART (15).
3Furthermore, in the current financial climate, and with a growing burden of
disease attributable to non-communicable diseases, HIV funding is not likely to
increase at the same rate as previously observed. In fact, the growth rate of donor
funding for HIV/AIDS has already slowed significantly (16,17). Since the financial
recession in 2008, funding has stagnated and the growth rate of development
assistance by UN agencies slowed from 6 percent to 2 percent (17). This is critical
because current HIV programmes are not sustainable with the reduced rate of HIV
funding (18). Given this situation, ‘How to do more with less’ is a priority for global
donors aiming to improve access to HIV treatment (19). In brief, it is necessary to
consider improving the efficiency of HIV programmes within currently available, or
even contracting, budgets for HIV care.
In conclusion, the emergence of multi-country global donors has historically
resulted in a significant increase in the number of people benefiting from HIV
programmes. However, in the current funding climate, sustained or expanded
access will likely only be achieved by increasing efficiency. Current HIV funding
would not be sufficient to cover the majority of people living with HIV if current
trends continue. The goals of improving efficiency for global donors and their
concomitant activities to achieve the goals will be discussed in the next section.
1.2 The goals of global donors for improving efficiency
Pursuing efficiency with scarce resources is a common concern for decision
makers. In general, three concepts of efficiency are used in health economics:
technical, productive and allocation efficiency (20,21), each of which is described
in more detail below. This thesis will present one case study for each of these
forms of efficiency, as described in Section 1.3.
1.2.1 Technical efficiency
4Technical efficiency refers to the production of health output on the production
possibilities frontier. This means that a given level of output should be achieved
using a minimum level of inputs (20). Technical efficiency thus refers to the optimal
combination of resources for the delivery of health services (22). For example, if
treatment A needs 10 tablets to generate 1 Quality adjusted life years (QALYs) but
treatment B needs 20 tablets, treatment A is technically more efficient (21).
Technical efficiency can be improved by reducing the unit cost (23,24). The
majority of cost-effectiveness papers have informed questions regarding technical
efficiency (22). 1
In terms of improving technical efficiency, harm reduction intervention programme
is useful because it is a more cost effective intervention than ART (anti-retroviral
therapy). The unit cost of the intervention is much lower than the cost of ART.
Once infected with HIV, ARV costs are much higher to gain the same level of
health outcome than the costs of prevention interventions because HIV patients
should take medicine during their life (25,26). If harm reduction intervention is
properly used, HIV transmission can be prevented at much lower costs (25).
Technical efficiency is assessed based on the unit cost of a service (23). Overall,
harm reduction interventions are useful to improve technical efficiency.
1.2.2 Allocative efficiency
In the context of health economics, allocative efficiency means maximising the
population health of the community by appropriately allocating scarce resources
(21). When allocative efficiency is achieved, it is not possible to increase outputs
by reallocating resources between programmes or social groups (27). In other
1 Opinions differ as to which efficiency cost effectiveness analysis is linked with. Palmer et al. (21)
mention that productive efficiency is to compare alternatives. However, a number of health
economic studies link the concept of technical efficiency with cost effectiveness analysis (18,22,27).
This thesis follows the views of the majority.
5words, someone cannot be made better off without making others worse off in this
situation. Allocative efficiency is related to welfare economics and a societal
perspective (21).
Reaching high burden population groups to supply HIV testing is likely to improve
allocative efficiency. Greatest global burden of disease (GBD) frequently exists in
these communities as marginal communities often suffer from multiple co-morbidities
and vulnerabilities (25). As such, targeting these groups will tend to have a high(er)
impact on DALY reduction (28). Moreover, use of needles by injection drug users
(IDU) is a significant route of HIV transmission as it accounts for 5-10% transmission
of HIV globally (29). Men who have sex with men (MSM) groups in Africa have been
reported to have a higher HIV prevalence rate, ranging from 8.8% to 20% (30). In
particular, migrants in Malawi have been observed to be more exposed to HIV
infection (31). Once these high burden groups get infected, they can jeopardize the
whole society in a number of ways. To start with, people infected through interaction
with high risk groups will more than likely transmit HIV to their spouses (31).
Subsequently, HIV can then be transmitted to other parts of the country through
transport routes by lorry drivers or by fishermen on the shores in Africa (32). In South
Africa, IDU which only make up 1.2% of total population, account for 6% of total HIV
prevalence (25).2
The main problem is that once people get infected the treatment costs skyrockets
compared to prevention costs such as HIV testing and counseling (33). For example,
the cost of HIV testing per patient is US$ 11 (95% CI: US$ 10.81-12.86) (34), but the
cost per patient year initiated on ARV soars to US$ 208 in Malawi (35). As another
example, in Kenya, the cost of mobile HIV testing reaching people in rural areas was
$8 - $20 (36), while the cost per patient on ART was $206 (37). As a consequence,
resources will be inevitably concentrated on HIV infected people with high treatment
2 As an extreme example, in USA, MSM groups account for 61% of HIV infection among adults
(245).
6costs; thus, maximising the population health of the community becomes impossible.
The investments in these communities will yield a greater number of cases averted
than similar investments in communities already at lower risk of infection. Clearly,
considering that HIV is a communicable disease and the at-risk groups such as IDU,
MSM and commercial sex workers are more likely to transmit HIV than the general
population (25), it would be more beneficial to reach these deprived groups in a
targeted approach thus improving allocative efficiency.
Measuring equity is one way to assess service access for vulnerable groups.
Equity of access to health services is considered a way to address health inequity
(38). The concentration index will be negative if marginalised groups use health
services less than the whole population does (39). Inequity in HIV testing in low-
and middle-income countries, such as those in sub-Saharan Africa, is generally
higher since inequity is strongly affected by socioeconomic factors such as gender
or marital status (3,40,41). In short, service access for vulnerable groups can be
assessed by measuring equity.
As such, improved equity could be viewed as a proxy for improved allocative
efficiency in the context of HIV testing in developing countries. In this connection,
Mcpake et al. (42) argue that equity may be viewed as a proxy for allocative
efficiency in an imperfect competitive market.
71.2.3 Productive efficiency
The conventional concept of the productive efficiency is maximising outputs
within a given level of inputs (18,20,21). In the context of HIV, this efficiency is
generally interpreted as maximising the number of uptake of HIV treatment (18).
In the majority of resource limited countries, health systems will encounter
financial challenges as donor funding declines and goals ambitiously encourage
90:90:90 (43). Considering a reduction in donor HIV spending from US$ 7.7 billion
in 2009 to US$ 6.9 billion in 2010 (44), it is important to maximise outputs with
currently available funding. This example shows that pursuing productive
efficiency is an important task for global donors.
Extensive efforts have been made to improve the productive efficiency when
global donors supply HIV drugs(18). To do so, global donors focus on the strategy
such as voluntary pooled procurement to buy more HIV drugs with given quantities
of budgets (45). This is attributed to the fact that ARV price is a main component
of HIV treatment. For example, mean treatment costs per person are
approximately US$ 880 per patient, of which US$ 514 were for drugs costs in the
PEPFAR funded HIV programme (18). To sum up, global donors began to
concentrate on producing maximum quantity of outputs in order to supply more
HIV drugs and pursue productive efficiency of HIV programmes.
1.3 The activities of the global donors for local problems
This section will briefly describe the three case studies used to explore efficiency
improvements in HIV programming in this thesis. As previously mentioned,
improvements in technical efficiency will be explored through the case of harm
reduction in the Ukraine, allocative efficiency will be explored using the case of
8equity in treatment access in Malawi and productive efficiency will be explored
using the case of voluntary pooled procurement to reduce the price of an HIV drug.
Within each section below, a brief description of the ‘intervention’ or ‘case’ is
provided before a brief review of the literature, describing what is already known
about harm reduction, equity in HIV treatment access and voluntary pooled
procurement and where knowledge gaps remain.
1.3.1 Improving harm reduction to promote technical efficiency
Harm reduction is a public health intervention designed to reduce the multiple
harmful outcomes of injecting drug use, including increased risk of HIV
transmission (46,47). Needle and syringe programmes (NSPs) and opioid
substitution therapy (OST) are typical harm reduction interventions for injecting
drug users (IDUs), typically combined with ART, condom distribution and health
education programmes. In addition to preventing HIV, these efforts can be
understood as an attempt to overcome equity concerns and reach marginalised
groups(48). From 2004 to 2008, the GFATM supported approximately US$ 180
million in harm reduction programmes in 42 countries. The GFATM is thus a
major funder of harm reduction interventions in developing countries (49).
Given the fact that the global donors consistently support harm reduction
interventions in low- and middle-income countries such as Ukraine, the evidence
on the cost-effectiveness of the interventions is essential to evaluate their activities.
Injecting drug use in Eastern Europe accounts for up to 80% of HIV infections (25)
whereas the injecting drug use in Africa was negligible (50). Most IDUs need harm
reduction interventions, but existing harm reduction services in Eastern Europe do
not cover most IDUs, accounting for merely 10% of IDUs in the region (25). Based
on the fact that GFATM supports harm reduction as its commitment to fund
evidence-based, cost-effective interventions (7), it is required to have the evidence
9on cost-effectiveness to secure the funding for harm reduction interventions and
call funders’ attention on this intervention.
In addition, harm reduction interventions are effective to improve technical
efficiency. This point was already mentioned in Section 1.2.1. This intervention can
save ARV costs if it is appropriately implemented. Also, this intervention can
increase QALYs by preventing HIV infection. In sum, harm reduction intervention
can improve technical efficiency.
Chapter 2 will explain that the cost effectiveness of a single intervention is
known from available evidence. However, the CEA of harm reduction has only
been partially established. A literature review was performed to summarise
existing evidence on the cost-effectiveness of the most common harm reduction
strategies; NSPs, OST, and combined NSP and OST. The literature review found
an evidence gap about the cost-effectiveness of combined intervention of NSPs
and OST. The detailed literature review on harm reduction intervention is
incorporated in Section 2.2, Chapter 2.
Thus, harm reduction interventions conducted by GFATM appear to be an
appropriate case study to offer evidence on cost-effectiveness in order to assess
interventions of global health initiatives (GHI) given the fact that GFATM is one of
the major funder for harm reduction interventions (7). As it is possible that global
donors and health system apply for different levels of thresholds, WHO CHOICE
threshold can be used for this empirical study (51). This thesis is expected to
better inform our understanding of the cost-effectiveness of harm reduction in this
context. The second chapter of this thesis will conduct a cost-effectiveness
analysis of combined harm reduction intervention in Ukraine. Two types of harm
reduction interventions will be combined: NSPs and OST.
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The main method that will be used in this chapter is a Markov model. This model
was chosen for the following reasons. First, primary data for harm reduction
interventions carried out in Ukraine were not available. Therefore, it was not
available to conduct a cost-effectiveness analysis using a randomised controlled
trial (RCT) data. Alternatively, cost-effectiveness analysis based on modelling can
be employed (52). Second, the Markov model is useful to estimate cost-
effectiveness of a chronic disease such as HIV or asthma (53). This is because it
assumes current patient state is independent from previous state (52).
Consequently, in this study, the model would be appropriate to estimate costs and
outcomes in terms of QALYs and HIV infection for the three strategies of harm
reduction intervention. The model also attempts to estimate uncertainty with
probability distributions. Monte Carlo simulation will be used based on these
distributions, due to uncertainty in the results of the model.
The main data for cost is grant data obtained from the GFATM website. This
offers costs spent on the harm reduction interventions implemented by the GFATM.
The value of QALYs and HIV infection averted will be obtained from existing
researches. Costs per cycle will be presented to use the Markov model.
In the context of global HIV finance, there are grant givers and grant receivers.
Then, should whose willingness to pay (WTP) be applied when we carry out a cost
effectiveness analysis? Given the fact that there are multiple donors in a global
HIV setting, this is a relevant question since the answer for this question can
change the conclusions of a cost effectiveness analysis. Also, this question is
related with technical efficiency since the level of appropriate resource allocation is
decided by WTP and cost-effectiveness (CE) threshold. This point will be
discussed in the next section.
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1.3.1.1 Cost-effectiveness threshold and willingness to pay (WTP): Whose WTP
counts?
Cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) starts from the notion that there is a limited
budget that can be used for improving population health. To maximise the
population health with given budgets, cost-effectiveness (CE) threshold is used for
CEA. Although WHO CHOICE threshold is widely used at the moment, it is not
without critics. This section explores the relationship between willingness to pay
and the threshold, whose willingness to pay (WTP) counts, and recent debate
around the appropriate value of threshold in a global health setting.
In principle, the appropriate threshold needs to be decided based on how much
a health system should be willing to pay for improving population health (54). As
various global funders emerge, however, it is not straightforward to decide which
cost-effectiveness threshold needs consideration when the role of donors and
health systems are ambiguous.
The threshold of cost-effectiveness analysis informs whether a new treatment is
cost-effective under the current budget constraints. Due to the limited budget of
health care provider, the appropriate threshold is the opportunity cost replaced by
a new treatment (55). For example, the threshold ranges from 20,000 to 30,000
per QALYs in the UK despite criticism (56). That is to say, incremental cost-
effectiveness ratio (ICER) should not exceed this threshold to be accepted as a
cost-effective treatment.
As a classical way of presenting WTP, threshold can be presented as a single
number. In that case, the threshold may reflect the view of health care system (57),
a medical programme (58) or institutions such as NICE (59) on WTP. These
thresholds can be labelled ‘local thresholds’. As aforementioned, UK use threshold
of GBP 20,000–30,000 since 2004 (56,60). Amongst the low- and middle-income
12
countries, Thailand use their own threshold value of 100,000 Baht in 2008 values
(51). However, the problem here is that there exist two parallel thresholds
simultaneously. With respect to the Thailand case, some cost-effectiveness
studies use local threshold value as a threshold while other studies use WHO
CHOICE threshold (51). As a result, it is difficult to make a decision on which
intervention is regarded as cost-effective depending on what thresholds have been
applied.
In some studies, the WTP of individual patients rather than donors or health
systems is the matter of interest. The WTP of individual measures how much
individuals are willing to pay when they use a certain health service (61). Sachs
(62) argues that critical diseases such as HIV/AIDS that incur high burden of
treatment to patients can go well beyond income losses. If so, threshold based on
WTP of individuals will increase the risk of death as the threshold does not
appropriately measure the cost of the disease (63). This approach is based on the
notion that each individual is entitled to spend GDP per capita as a fair share of a
country's wealth (64,65). However, it is unrealistic to assume a country is willing to
allocate its whole GDP to health care (65). This example shows the WTP of
individual patients can be a major concern for health economic studies.
Similarly, cost-effectiveness threshold estimated on the willingness to pay (WTP)
may reflect the WTP of the citizen living in the country. Willingness to pay
approach is to define social value by preference approach rather than based on
opportunity costs (54,66). Shiroiwa et al. (67) explored WTP per QALY in 6
countries: US, UK, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and Australia. Randomly sampled
respondents answered questionnaires asking how much of money you are willing
to pay for increasing QALYs. The estimated WTP values were WTP values were
Japan: JPY 5 million, Korea: KWN 68 million, Taiwan: NT$ 2.1 million, UK: £23
000, Australia: AU$ 64 000, and US: US$ 62 000.
13
However, as the authors acknowledged, if respondents do not think about
budget, the WTP of respondents can increase expenditure on health care as they
wish to pay more. In other words, the public’s view on the WTP can be different
from the view of politicians or decision makers, and may not properly reflect the
allocation of health care budgets (68).
Only a few disease-specific WTP studies exist and estimated values of WTP
that may vary significantly depending on the methodology such as a sample
selection (63). If each country’s cost-effectiveness threshold simply reflects the
WTP of its own citizens, these values may be different appropriately across
countries (69). Therefore, there is no clear guideline regarding which WTP based
threshold needs to be applied for countries where WTP was not estimated. In
other words, it is needed to consider another type of threshold for cost-
effectiveness studies at global level.
In the context of the global health funding, there exists two players in the
healthcare market: a donor and a recipient country. In general, donors implement
interventions in low- and middle-income countries while a recipient country acts
merely as a grant receiver. Usually, donors not only provide interventions but also
support finance. As an example, UNICEF and UNAIDS directly carry out
prevention of mother-to-child transmission (PMTCT) interventions in resource
limited countries (70). In this case, the donors work as a both funder and health
service provider.
GFATM relies on the different type of funding mechanism. It only disburses the
grants to the recipient countries (45,71,72). Then countries merely play roles as
healthcare providers. For example, in a number of countries, ARV intervention was
carried out with the financing from GFATM. But the role of GFATM is restricted to
the disbursement of grants, which is what differs from other international
organisations such as UNAIDS. Local intervention is carried out in the country
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where GFATM grants were given (46). This makes it of no use to distinguish a
payer and a provider since the payer and the provider are separated under the
GFATM system.
For this case, a threshold based on the human capital approach such as WHO
threshold will be useful (51). It is because that it may be possible that donors and
health system can apply for different levels of thresholds. In other words, the
donors and the governments of the recipient countries may have different budget
constraints (51). WHO Commission on Macroeconomics and Health (73) reported
the WHO CHOICE threshold of three times GDP per capita at a given country was
deemed ‘cost-effective’ and one times GDP per capita deemed ‘very cost-effective’
for averting DALYs. When one times GDP or three times GDP is used as a
threshold for cost-effectiveness analysis, it assumes that a country is willing to pay
that much to increase DALYs (66). However, local decision makers would not think
that people living with HIV should pay for the treatments when GFATM support
grants. As such, it is unclear what donors or countries have payer roles.
1.3.1.2 Criticism of WHO CHOICE threshold
There also exists criticism about whether the WHO CHOICE threshold is
practically useful. The problem of adopting a generalised GDP-based threshold to
all over the world is that the threshold cannot reflect opportunity costs varying
across countries (54,74).
In addition, some have argued that there is no empirical basis of this estimation
on WHO CHOICE threshold (75). Recent studies argue that the current threshold
based on WHO CHOICE (three times GDP per capita) is so high that the new
treatment can easily fall within the threshold although it is not sure whether the
new treatment is more cost-effective than the conventional treatment (54). For
instance, in Kenya, a new clean water intervention was cost-effective at I$ 614 per
15
DALY averted. Even if the effectiveness is reduced by half, I$ 1228 per DALY
averted is still far lower than three times GDP per capita in Kenya (66). As such, in
that case, it is difficult to insist that the new intervention cannot be accepted under
the current threshold.
Another criticism of the WHO CHOICE threshold is that using entire GDP per
capita to obtain QALYs requires substantial sacrifice from both individuals and
society. If a certain intervention is cost-effective at the threshold of one times GDP
per capita in a certain country, the entire GDP per capital should be spent every
year per person (66,76). In terms of WHO CHOICE guideline, this is deemed cost-
effective, but in most cases the healthcare budget is limited. In line with this, some
have argued it is not possible to offer health care for much of the population
without increasing tax or government debt when threshold is above GDP per
capita (64). This approach is unrealistic as it assumes a country is willing to spend
its whole GDP to health care (65). In addition, this approach is based on average
cost-effectiveness ratio rather than the ICER, so it is doubtful whether it can serve
as an appropriate value for the threshold using ICER (77). In brief, recent debate
on the WHO CHOICE threshold acknowledges that the current value of the
threshold is high without empirical evidence. Bearing this in mind, a few
researches work on econometric analysis to estimate appropriate level of
threshold for countries. Woods et al. (54) argued that threshold value should range
from 1% to 51% of low income countries rather than 3 times or 1 times GDP,
assuming different income elasticity across countries.
Nevertheless, the recent studies regarding an appropriate level of the threshold
still does not emphasise the issue of ‘who is payer’ in the global donor market.
When GFATM is involved, this issue becomes more complicated because it mainly
works as a funder, not a provider. In current circumstances, where external
funding from international donors is a main resource of HIV intervention in low-
and middle-income countries, consideration on the issue of ‘payer’ is also
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necessary as the discrepancy of budget constraints between donor and health
system can result in a different decision on the CEA of the identical intervention.
1.3.2 HIV testing to improve allocative efficiency
Global donors mainly support sub-Saharan countries for HIV testing services.
For instance, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)
promotes counselling with HIV test to reduce risky behaviour causing HIV/AIDS in
African countries, allocating funds for at least 11 new HIV testing centres in
2001(78).
Malawi was one of the first two countries receiving the support from GFATM.
With the support from GFATM, the Malawi Ministry of Health planned to increase
the number of HIV testing services including VCT facilities (79). By late 2004 and
early 2005, testing began to be available in rural areas, first at district hospitals
and then at clinics (80). The number of VCT centres increased significantly: by the
end of 2005, Malawi had 249 VCT centres (81). In 2004, although there were
many HIV test sites such as private hospitals, three major Malawi AIDS
Counselling and Resource Organization (MACRO) sites were located at only big
cities: Mzuzu, Lilongwe, and Blantyre. In 2008, a national programme offering HIV
testing to pregnant women was implemented at more than 500 sites in Malawi (82).
Consequently, mobile and door-to-door testing have been widely supplied (82).
These examples show the efforts of global donors to supply HIV testing in Malawi.
The literature review presented in Chapter 3 will explain that HIV testing in low-
and middle-income countries such as sub-Saharan Africa is more strongly
associated with socioeconomic factors such as gender or marital status from
available evidence. Also, it will be addressed that the efforts of global donors to
improve access to HIV testing appear successful so far in Malawi. However,
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equity of HIV test access has not been explored in the Malawian context. The full
literature review can be found in section 3.2, Chapter 3.
In addition, achieving equity in HIV testing is an effective way of improving
allocative efficiency in HIV treatment for the whole society. Compared to ARV
therapy, HIV testing is relatively cheap and highly cost-effective in terms of DALYs
(83). This means that the uptake of HIV testing would be less affected by
affordability for individuals. MSM groups are known to have 19.3 times higher odds
of HIV infection than the general population (84). Particularly, gender inequity in
HIV testing can have critical effects not only on individual health but also on health
systems. Firstly, it can raise the possibility of transmitting HIV from mother to
children, as the mother is not aware of her HIV infection (85). Secondly, the failure
to detect HIV in its early stages will diminish the benefits of ARV (85). As a result, if
inequity in HIV testing is increased, scarce resources will not be used in a Pareto
optimal way, significantly increasing the HIV treatment costs. In brief, this case
study is appropriate to understand allocative efficiency.
As such, this case study in Chapter 3 explores a recent change in inequity for
the HIV test uptake. In other words, this is to see whether supports of global
donors for increasing the uptake of HIV testing have reduced inequity in it. Chapter
3 in this thesis will carry out an analysis on the socioeconomic inequity of HIV test
uptake in Malawi. Using need and non-need variables, decomposed concentration
index will be estimated. The need variables include symptoms of sexually
transmitted infections (STIs), while non-need variables include wealth, education,
literacy, and marriage status.
Concentration index is a standard tool to measure equity in the use of health
service (39). A main method used in this study is a decomposed concentration
index introduced by Van de Poel et al. (86). This concentration index is different
from a standard concentration index in that the highest income group is used as a
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reference to show hidden inequity. This is mainly because higher prevalence of
HIV among the highest income group is expected to put a new complexion on
horizontal inequity. In general, a disease is more common for the poor group, so
needs are concentrated in the poor group (87). However, conversely, HIV is more
common for the highest-income group in Malawi (88,89). This can change the
degree of horizontal inequity, and the decomposed concentration index by Van de
Poel et al. is expected to perform better.
The main data used in this study is from the DHS. DHS data, funded and
collected by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID),
reflects the activity done by USAID (78), so the data is appropriate to assess
whether equity was enhanced by global donors’ support on grant recipients
countries. Voluntary HIV testing has been implemented in 29 sub-Saharan
countries since 2001, and information on this has been collected by 47 DHS
surveys (90). DHS survey was designed to offer health and demographic
indicators at both country and regional levels. DHS 2010 and DHS 2004 collected
detailed HIV-related data including whether respondents received an HIV test and
symptoms of STIs. The age of the respondents ranges from 15 to 49 for women
and from 15 to 54 for men (88). This survey includes following districts: Mulanje,
Thyolo, Kasungu, Salima, Machinga, Zomba, Mangochi, Mzimba, Blantyre, and
Lilongwe. GPS information was also collected by field staff. Men and women in the
age between 14 and 59 year after providing consent were interviewed with
questionnaires. Asset index and the variable of whether they received HIV test
were included. In sum, this data is appropriate for this study as the data contains
information about needs, socioeconomic status of interviewees and receipt of HIV
test.
This study explores the effect of all types of HIV testing included in the data
rather than merely focusing on the HIV testing facilities. Despite intensive literature
search, very few literatures were found mentioning the information about the
location of HIV testing facilities in Malawi. Literature search using the keywords
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HIV testing facilities, Malawi, and policy identified 17 works of literature (#1–3 in
Appendix 2-1). Likewise, a literature search using the keywords HIV testing,
location, and Malawi identified 11 works of literature (#4 #5 #6 in Appendix 2-1).
Combining the search strategies of#1–3 and #4–6 identified 27 papers. Excluding
duplicates, 24 literatures were included. Google Scholar was also used for the
additional literature review. However, none of these articles informed the detailed
location of HIV testing facilities in Malawi. As a result, it is not possible to explore
the role of policy decision making in the location of testing facilities and the
consequent equity with current information.
In brief, this empirical study attempts to explore whether how the support of
global donors, expressed as increasing supply of HIV testing, is associated with
equity in HIV test uptake. A decomposed concentration index will address this
research question in Chapter 3.
1.3.3 Drug procurement to improve productive efficiency
Currently, global donors dominate the procurement of ARV markets. Major
donors such as GFATM and the US President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief
(PEPFAR) currently purchase large volume of ARVs to supply national treatment
programmes (91). For instance, PEPFAR captures 40% of the total market for the
first fixed-dose combination (FDC) version of 3TC/NVP/d4T30 in 2008 (92). By
2008, PEPFAR accounts for 27–34% of market volume for first line ARVs such as
EFV, 3TC, NVP, d4T and ZDV while GFATM captures 47–57% (92). Given this
fact, it is no exaggeration to say that global donors play a major role in the
procurement of ARV.
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This domination is mainly caused by the large volume of purchasing ARV.3
What happens by purchasing large quantities is to allow global donors for the
power of monopsony. As they purchase in large quantities, the global donors can
play a dominant role in global ARV markets. Global donors are able to control ARV
prices as they use competitive tendering (69). They buy HIV drugs in large
quantities, deciding which manufacturers will supply ARVs among the bidders.
One of the tools that help global donors to dominate the procurement markets is
pooled procurement. Pooled purchasing can simplify the process of procurement
for both manufacturers and buyers, but risks distorting the market with monopsony
(93). In the end, pooled procurement will reduce the number of purchasers and
thus could result in restructuring of the current global ARV market (94). Pooled
procurement is also called group purchasing and involves bulk purchasing (95). In
the process of implementing pooled procurement, purchasing is done by one
procurement body on behalf of a group of countries. The main advantage of the
pooled procurement process is to reduce drug costs through economies of scale.
GFATM initiated voluntary pooled procurement (VPP) in 2010 to reduce the
prices of HIV test kits, ARVs, long-lasting insecticide-treated nets (LLINs) and
artemisinin-based combination therapies (ACTs). Between 2009 and 2011, 47
countries joined and VPP purchased 5 core health products: ARVs for HIV,
artemisinin-based combination therapy (ACTs) for malaria, long-lasting insecticidal
bed nets (LLINs), rapid diagnostic tests (RDTs) for tuberculosis (TB), and
condoms. Between 2009 and 2011, approximately 23% of above products that
3 In addition, global donors were able to negotiate the prices of ARVs with holding the position of
monopsony. This is referred to as ‘third-party negotiation’ (94). For example, the Clinton Health
Access Initiative (CHAI) negotiated to reduce the price of the first-line treatment tenofovir +
emtricitabine + efavirenz (TDF + FTC+ EFV) from the 2007 price of US$487 to US$349 in 2008
(92,189). This negotiation power gives global donors an advantage in procurement markets. This is
encouraging in terms of expanding access of HIV patients, especially in low-income setting since it
was possible for global donors to supply HIV drugs at reduced prices.
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GFATM financed were procured through the VPP programme, and GFATM
estimates that the VPP saved $58 million between 2010 and 2011 (96). Under the
VPP system, each principal recipient (PR) country volunteered to join the
procurement programme. Overall, 307 million daily doses of antiretroviral drugs
were procured and approximately 336,000 people received ARV therapy through
this programme (97).
The literature review presented in Chapter 4 reveals that pooled procurement
lowered costs for condoms and other HIV commodities. However, evidence for the
effectiveness of VPP in reducing drug prices is incomplete. The full literature
review can be found in Section 4.2, Chapter 4.
In addition, for the goal of improving productive efficiency in HIV intervention
programmes, drug procurement is an important process to maximise outputs (98).
Productive efficiency needs that all companies (or global donors) run using best
practice processes. It was known that improved efficiency in ARV procurement
can lower the cost of treatment for HIV (12). For example, Improved procurement
system reduced PEPFAR’s treatment costs per patient to US$ 335 in 2012 from
US$ 1100 in 2005 (12). Inefficient procurement and supply systems, and high ARV
costs remain to be the main obstacles to expanding access to essential HIV drugs
in resource limited countries (98). Pharmaceutical markets in resource limited
countries are constrained by insufficient procurement systems for HIV drugs (99).
Given this fact, global donors used strategies to improve productive efficiency of
the supply of HIV drugs and other commodities transported by logistic systems (3).
Likewise, the purpose of VPP is to improve productive efficiency. If the strategy of
VPP is effective, global donors or health systems can purchase more ARV drugs
with the same amount of budget, reducing the procurement prices. In conclusion,
this case study is appropriately linked with productive efficiency.
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As such, chapter 4 in this thesis aims to estimate the impact of VPP on the
procurement prices of ARV drugs using econometric methods. The purpose of
Chapter 4 in this thesis is to assess whether the new strategy of procurement of
global donors, voluntary pooled procurement, can be maintained in a near future
and reduce procurement prices of drugs for people living with HIV to antiretroviral
therapy.
The main method used in this chapter is difference-in-difference (DID) analysis.
DID is an appropriate method to use when comparing the effect of a policy change.
This method has a few advantages. First, DID is less subject to biases caused by
policies implemented at different time points across countries (100). Considering
that voluntary pooled procurement was implemented in different years by countries,
this is an appropriate method to estimate the policy effect. Second, DID controls
confounding factors by using fixed effects model (101). DID wipes away time
invariant factors (101) ; so, this is a preferred analysis to ‘before and after’ analysis.
When it compares over time within a country, DID eliminates the country fixed
effect.
The main source of data used in this study is provided by the purchase price
report of the Global Price Reporting Mechanism (GPRM). These are panel data
consisting of price data, mainly from low and middle-income countries. The data
set shows transaction volume, procurement price, destination country and
procurement date for the period 1999–2014. The data is freely available on the
WHO website, and a researcher can choose according to his/her interest, the type
of drug (generic or brand), name, strength of drug, and manufacturers. These data
are mainly obtained from international organisations such as the GFATM, the
Clinton Foundation, Crown Agent, the Global Drug Facility (GDF), the International
Dispensary Association (IDA), Mission Pharma, Management Sciences for Health
(MSH), the Partnership for Supply Chain Management (PFSCMS), the United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Children’s Fund
(UNICEF), and the WHO/Contracting and Procurement Service (WHO/CPS).
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In conclusion, an examination is needed of the effect of this programme on price
reduction of antiretroviral drugs. Given the amount of commodities related to HIV
treatment procured through this programme, the dominance of global donors on
procurement market using the VPP will be boosted up in the near future.
Depending on the result, this case study can be used as evidence encouraging
more countries to join VPP, justifying global donors’ dominance of ARV
procurement markets.
1.4 Conclusion
The emergence of global health initiatives have boosted health care financing
and improved both access and coverage of HIV treatment for people living with
HIV in low and middle income countries. However, although global donors grow
rapidly, some aspects of them have been overlooked.
This introductory chapter demonstrated a paucity of evidence of their
performance related with the efficiency of HIV programmes. Thus, this thesis
attempts to fill this gap by dealing with several neglected issues of both
intervention on people living with HIV and the procurement of HIV commodities of
global donors, which the existing literature has omitted. This thesis attempts to
evaluate the effect of global donors’ activities on deprived groups in the context of
HIV treatment such as injection drug users and low-income countries such as
Malawi. Also, this thesis will assess the policy impact of the programme
implemented by the global donors. To sum up, this thesis aims to not only
evaluate the results of interventions such as harm reduction interventions but also
provide implications for a policy on the procurement process of HIV drugs
conducted by the global donors.
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In the context of contracting funding and expanding demand for spending on
HIV programs to achieve 90:90:90 goals, this thesis will explore whether global
donors and their beneficiary countries can maximise the effectiveness of every
dollar spent. Three case studies will be used to explore the potential for improving
efficiency; in Chapter 4, voluntary pooled procurement is used as a case to
explore the potential for improving productive efficiency; in Chapter 2, cost-
effectiveness of harm reduction interventions as an example of the potential for
improving technical efficiency; and in Chapter 3, equity in HIV testing is used as a
proxy for improvements in allocative efficiency. In brief, this thesis is to explore the
role of Global Donors in improving the efficiency of HIV prevention and treatment.
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2 Economic evaluation on harm reduction
intervention4
4 This chapter was published in Dec 2014 in ‘Cost effectiveness and resource
allocation’ : Kim et al. (2014), Comparing the cost effectiveness of harm reduction
strategies: a case study of the Ukraine, Cost Effectiveness and Resource Allocation
2014 12:25. This paper was attached in appendix.
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2.1 Introduction
There are an estimated 15.9 million injecting drug users (IDUs) worldwide, 80% of
whom live in developing and transitional countries (25). The concurrent epidemics of
HIV and injecting drug use have rapidly increased HIV prevalence (49), with 10% of
HIV/Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS) cases worldwide attributed to
IDUs (29,102).
HIV prevalence in Eastern Europe and Central Asia has almost tripled since 2000
(25), to an estimated 1.4 million people in 2011 (103). The region is also home to
3.7 million IDUs (25). Ukraine’s HIV prevalence is the highest in Europe and a 2010
study found that 50% of IDUs in Ukraine were HIV positive (104). The Global Fund
to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria (GFATM) has spent approximately $20m
on harm reduction in the Ukraine (105).
Harm reduction interventions aim to reduce the harmful results of drug use.
Although there is no agreed definition, a small number of interventions are commonly
described in the literature as “harm reduction” including; condom provision,
community based outreach, peer-led interventions, needle and syringe programmes
(NSP) and opioid substitution therapy (OST) (106). Needle and syringe programmes
offer a clean needle and syringe to injecting drug users (IDUs), while opioid
substitution therapy (OST) replaces heroin with a less addictive drug such as
methadone or buprenorphine under medical supervision. As IDUs undergoing OST
may continue drug use outside of the programme (107), combining NSP with OST
may be more effective in reducing HIV transmission than a single intervention (108).
This paper will focus only on three harm reduction strategies; NSP, OST, and
combined therapy (NSP and OST).
This study’s purpose is to improve our understanding of the relative cost
effectiveness of harm reduction strategies. A literature review on the cost-
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effectiveness of harm reduction describes what is known, and what is not. A cost-
effectiveness analysis of harm-reduction is then conducted using data from GFATM
for the Ukraine. The analysis compares NSP, OST and a combined intervention. To
the best of our knowledge, this is the first study comparing a combined intervention
with NSP or OST alone, in any setting.
2.2 Literature Review
The literature on harm reduction cost-effectiveness was reviewed to summarise
current evidence. Web of Science, Econlit and Pubmed were the primary databases
searched. A supplementary search was conducted using Google Scholar.
Reference lists of identified papers were hand-searched for further appropriate
papers. The search terms were: cost-effectiveness, HIV, NSP, OST, harm reduction,
needle and syringe, and methadone. Only papers published in English, in peer-
reviewed journals were considered.
The initial search identified 18 papers. After reviewing titles and abstracts, 3 were
excluded. After reading the full papers, 3 further papers were excluded and 3 were
added following a hand search of the reference lists. The final review includes 15
papers listed in Table 1, two of which are literature reviews themselves.
This literature review summarizes the systematic review papers(109,110) and then
lists the papers published since their publication(108,111–120). One exceptional
case is the research by Van den berg et al. (121). This study was added to bolster
the evidence around the combined intervention because the majority of the papers
since the systematic reviews focus on a single therapy. Only one retrieved study by
Degenhardt et al. (108) focused on the effectiveness of combined intervention of
NSP and OST.
The first two papers in Table 1 are reviews of harm reduction strategies by
Connock et al. (109) and Jones et al. (110). Connock et al. (109) conducted a
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systematic review and cost effectiveness analysis of OST. They conclude that
methadone dominates buprenorphine, both of which are licensed for use as opioid
substitutes. Jones et al. (110) conducted a systematic review of NSP. Jones et al.
(110) conclude from their review that in terms of reducing HIV incidence and
prevalence among IDUs, NSPs are cost-effective.
While the review papers aimed to explore the cost effectiveness of a single
intervention, a number of studies conducted since the reviews, have attempted to
compare these single interventions with an alternative. For example, Van den berg
et al. (121), (cited in the review by Jones et al. ) compared a combined intervention
with incomplete harm reduction. They concluded that combined intervention is more
cost effective than incomplete harm reduction. Van den berg et al. (13) compared full
harm reduction(NSP +OST) vs incomplete harm reduction (NSP +OST). However,
they assumed incomplete harm reduction always offers OST, just changing ‘the dose
of OST’. Therefore, patients who get incomplete harm reduction always get OST as
a base case. Likewise, Degenhardt et al. (108) compared combined intervention
(OST+NSP) with ART and found that combined intervention of OST and NSP and
ART gained more effectiveness than either OST+NSP or ART .
All NSP studies that reported NSP as a primary intervention used ‘no NSP and no
intervention’ as a comparator. However, studies of OST show more varied
comparators; ‘no OST’ (113–115) , combined ART intervention (108,118), and
buprenorphine(109).
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TABLE 1 : SUMMARY OF SYSTEMATIC REVIEW RESULT
Study Comparator Intervention
Evaluated
Form of
economic analyses
Perspective
taken
Model used Time
horizon
Outcome
measure
Jones et al.
(110)†
Cost utility(N=12)
Cost benefit(N=1)
Behavioural models using
simplified Bernoulli
process(N=4)
Simulated the
transmission(N=2)
The theory of needle
circulation originally
developed by Kaplan and
O’Keefe (N=4)
HIV
incidence(N=11)
HCV
incidence(N=1)
HIV and HCV
incidence(N=1)
Connock et al.
(109)†
cost–utility(N=5) Societal
perspective(N=5)
Healthcare
system(N=6)
Markov(N=3)
Dynamic(N=3)
Monte Carlo(N=1)
QALY(N=6)
Belani and
Muennig (111)
no NSP NSP Cost utility Societal Decision model 1 year Infection
averted & QALYs
Wammes et al.
(112)
OST OST (coverage 5% to
40%)
Cost
effectiveness/cost
analysis
Societal Mathematical
transmission model
20 year Infection
averted
Guinness et al.
(113)
non
intervention
OST Cost utility Provider Mathematical model 3 year Infection
averted & DALYs
Tran, Mills, et
al. (115)
non OST OST Cost utility Health service
provider
Real cohort data 9 month QALYs
Tran, Nguyen,
et al. (114)
non OST OST Cost utility Vietnam health
care system
Decision analytical model 1 year Infection
averted & QALYs
Tran, Ohinmaa,
et al. (122)
OST&ART OST Cost utility Vietnam health
care system
Decision tree monte carlo
simulation
1 year Infection
averted & QALYs
Connock et
al. (109)**
Buprenorphine OST(methadone vs
buprenorphine)
Cost utility NHS Markov monte carlo
simulation
1 year QALYs
Degenhardt et ART, Combined(NSP&OST) Cost Transmission model 5 years Infection
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al. (108) NSP&OST&ART effectiveness aveted
Alistar, Owens,
and Brandeau
(117)
OST&ART
ART alone
OST Cost utility Provider dynamic compartmental
model
20 year Infection
averted & QALYs
Li et al. (118) ART, VCT Combined(NSP&OST) Cost utility Mathematical 30 year Infection
averted & QALYs
Van den berg
et al.*(121)
Methadone
dose or NEP use
alone
Combined(NSP& OST) Not stated Cohort study 20 years Incidence rate
ratio
Kwon et al.
(119)
no NSP NSP Cost utility Health sector Mathematical model lifetime Infection
averted & QALYs
Zhang et al.
(120)
no NSP NSP Cost utility Societal Mathematical model 7 years Infection
averted & DALYs
†: Systematic review
*: included in Jones et al. (110)
**:Connock et al. (109) carried out a systematic review and a cost effectiveness analysis in one paper.
31
Of the papers listed in Table 1, ten used either QALYs gained or DALYs averted
as a measure of outcome. All of the papers estimated both cost per infection averted
and cost per either QALY or DALY.
This review highlights a gap in the evidence regarding the cost effectiveness of
harm reduction, it is necessary to compare which mono-therapy (OST or NSP) is
more cost effective, and whether mono-therapy is more cost effective than combined
intervention – whether or not ART is offered. This is not because the provision of
ART is unimportant, but because the literature has moved on to evaluate the cost
effectiveness of the provision of ART with harm reduction – without first considering
what is the most cost effective harm reduction package. As described above, there
are studies arguing for the relative cost effective of NSP (111), of OST (112) and of
combined intervention (108,118,121). However, no study that we could find
compared the cost effectiveness of these three harm reduction alternatives. To fill
this evidence gap, we conduct a CEA of harm reduction comparing NSP, OST, and
combined intervention, using each intervention as a comparator.
2.3 Section 2: Case study of the Ukraine
The largest IDU populations in Eurasia are in the Russian Federation (1.8 million)
and the Ukraine (296,000) (25). Nearly half of IDUs in the Ukraine live with HIV(25),
the highest prevalence rate in Europe(104). GFATM has spent approximately $ 20m
on harm reduction in the Ukraine since 2004(105). Considering that GFATM
disbursed US$ 361 million through 120 grants in 55 countries between 2002 and
2009 (7), the amount spent in the Ukraine is significant for a single country. That said,
while GFATM provides significant international support for harm-reduction programs
(7,49), these investments have seldom been evaluated.
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2.4 Methods
Consistent with previous research in this area (109,123), this study uses a Markov
model, assuming three states of ‘infected’, ‘uninfected (well)’, and ‘dropped’. The
model is designed to estimate costs and outcomes in terms of QALYs and HIV
infections averted over 60 months, for the three strategies. The model estimates
uncertainty using probability distributions. Monte Carlo simulation was then carried
out using these distributions to account for uncertainty in the results of the model.
Figure 1 illustrates one cycle of the Markov decision model in this study. ‘Infected’
status occurs when patients are confirmed as HIV positive while ‘uninfected’ occurs
when patients are HIV negative. ‘Dropped’ means that IDUs quit any harm reduction
interventions they were attending. It is assumed that there is no mortality within the 5
year harm reduction period. This is consistent with the approach used by Vickerman
et al. (124). As the objective of this study is to compare the cost effectiveness of
harm reduction strategies irrespective of ART provision, ART is not offered in any
intervention including ‘no intervention’.
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FIGURE 1: DECISION MODEL
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A Markov Monte Carlo simulation with 10,000 iterations was conducted. It is
known that at least 440 iterations should be run to be 95% sure that the estimate of
the mean of the output is accurate(125). Consequently, it can be said that 10,000
iterations are sufficient to get a 95% confidence interval. This figure of 10,000
iterations is consistent with other research on HIV(126,127) and is recommended for
medical decision making generally (128). The main outcomes are expressed as cost
effectiveness ratios (CE) and incremental cost-effectiveness ratios (ICERs).
Treeage software was used to construct the model. Sensitivity analysis was
carried out to account for uncertainty in the cost data. Affordability of the three
strategies was assessed using probability sensitivity analysis (PSA) with the GDP of
the Ukraine as a threshold. Based on WHO recommendations, an intervention may
be considered cost effective if the cost per QALY is less than the country’s GDP per
capita(129)
2.4.1 Interventions compared
ICER=     
     
=   
  
C1 is the cost of the new intervention, and E1 is the effect of the new intervention,
whereas C0 and E0 are the cost and effect of the base case or comparator. Six
cases were considered in this study: NSP vs OST, NSP vs NSP&OST, NSP vs no
intervention, OST vs NSP&OST, OST vs no intervention, NSP&OST vs no
intervention. The result is shown as a form of PSA in Figures 2 and 3. The base case
is a no intervention, in which IDUs do not get any harm reduction intervention.
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TABLE 2: MODEL PARAMETERS
Simulation parameters
HIV incidence Base casevalue Duration
Distributio
n Source
Number of injections 400.00 1 year Degenhardt et al. (10), Aceijas et al. (29)
reduction in frequency of drug injections per
day ( ) 0.85 1 year Alistar, Owens, and Brandeau(117)
Pr of transmission ( ) 0.01 1 year Gouws et al. (130)
Using sterile injection equipment or condom
or methadone ( ) 0.90 1 year Calculated using formula (32)
number of days follow up (n) 60 cycle (5 years) 60 month (Treatment) Global Fund
HIV prevalence among IDUs (NSP) (P) 0.43 1 year Calculated using Vickerman et al. (124)
HIV prevalence among IDUs (OST) (P) 0.28 1 year Calculated using Vickerman et al. (124); Alistar,Owens, and Brandeau(117)
HIV prevalence among IDUs (NSP&OST) (P) 0.18 1 year Calculated using Degenhardt et al. (108)
Decrease in HIV incidence (NSP) 0.22
1 year
Vickerman et al. (124)
Decrease in HIV incidence (OST) 0.53 1 year Alistar, Owens, and Brandeau (117)
Decrease in HIV incidence (NSP&OST) 0.66 1 year Degenhardt et al. (108)
Probability
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Pr(attend to intervention) 0.0750 1 cycle Beta Assumed
Pr(mortality) if no intervention 0.03 1 cycle Beta Vickerman et al. (124)
Pr(infected) if no intervention 0.0446 1 cycle Beta Vickerman et al. (124)
Pr(well) if no intervention 0.0388 1 cycle Beta calculated
Pr(drop) from NSP&OST 0.0083 1 cycle Beta Calculated Pr(attend to intervention)
Pr(infected) from NSP&OST 0.0003 1 cycle Beta Degenhardt et al. (108)
Pr(well) from NSP&OST 0.9914 1 cycle Beta Calculated
Pr(drop) from NSP 0.0083 1 cycle Beta Calculated Pr(attend to intervention)
Pr(infected) from NSP 0.0005 1 cycle Beta Vickerman et al. (124)
Pr(well) from NSP 0.9912 1 cycle Beta Calculated
Pr(drop) from OST 0.0083 1 cycle Beta Calculated Pr(attend to intervention)
Pr(infected) from OST 0.0004 1 cycle Beta Alistar, Owens, and Brandeau(117)
Pr(well) from OST 0.9913 1 cycle Beta Calculated
Pr(infected) if dropped from intervention 0.0446 1 cycle Beta Vickerman et al. (124)
Pr(well) if dropped from intervention 0.9554 1 cycle Beta Calculated
Pr(drop) if infected from NSP&OST 0.0102 1 cycle Beta Yin et al. (131) ; Jones et al. (110)
Pr(attend) if infected from NSP&OST 0.9898 1 cycle Beta Calculated
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Pr(drop) if infected from NSP 0.0196 1 cycle Beta Jones et al. (110)
Pr(attend) if infected from NSP 0.9804 1 cycle Beta Calculated
Pr(drop) if infected from OST 0.0433 1 cycle Beta Yin et al. (131)
Pr(well) if infected from OST 0.9567 1 cycle Beta calculated
QOL
NSP 0.85 Normal Vickerman et al. (124)
OST 0.74(average
value for 54
week)
Normal
Connock et al. (109)
NSP & OST 0.95 Normal Vickerman et al. (124)
Infected(dropped) 0.63 Normal Connock et al. (109)
Cost
NSP
unit cost per patient 151.14 1 year gamma Global Fund (105)
Fixed 1197008.80 1 year gamma Estimated from GFATM grant proposal
OST
unit cost per patient 1752.00 1 year gamma WHO medical database
Fixed 700050.60 1 year gamma Estimated from GFATM grant proposal
NSP&OST
unit cost per patient(per year) 1903.14 1 year gamma Global Fund (105), WHO medical database
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Fixed 168286.96 1 year gamma Assumed from GFATM grant proposal
Other parameters
Consumer price index(CPI) 1.5680 World Bank (132)
Time horizon 5 years WHO (129)
Discount rate for cost 0.03 Uniform WHO (129)
Discount rate for outcome 0.03 Uniform WHO (129)
Population(NSP) 11000.00 Global Fund (105)
Population(OST) 5000.00 Global Fund (105)
Population(NSP & OST) 6000.00 Global Fund (105)
Initial HIV prevalence among IDUs 0.53 1 year Vickerman et al. (124)
IDU mortality rate per 1000 person-years 0.4 1 year Vickerman et al. (124)
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HIV incidence was obtained from previous literature. Given the initial HIV
prevalence(124), the effectiveness of each intervention was estimated. HIV
incidence and infections averted, were calculated with the following formula
(115,130):
              =  [1 −  (1 −  ) (   ) + (1 −  ) ]
Where S = total no of susceptible individuals (IDUs)
 =reduction in frequency of drug injections per day from the cohort data
  = Pr of transmission
  =reported using sterile injection equipment or condom or methadone
n= number of days follow up
p= HIV prevalence among IDUs
It was assumed that IDUs inject needles and syringes 400 times per year (133)
and that they inject constantly for the entire program period. The HIV prevalence rate
of IDUs for each intervention was calculated with parameters assuming that they are
on each intervention. The values of alpha and gamma are shown as a proportion,
and corresponding parameter values are presented in Table 2.
2.4.2 Distribution of parameters
To implement Monte Carlo simulation, the costs of each intervention were
estimated based on gamma distribution, which is nonnegative and allows the
maximum likelihood estimate of the population mean to be the sample mean[Table 2]
(134). The probability distribution of each intervention was estimated with beta
distribution, the value of which is between 0 and 1. Normal distribution was used for
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utilities of outcome for interventions. For the discount rate, a uniform distribution
between 0 and 1 was used.
2.4.3 Probability
In this study, transition probabilities for the ‘infected’, ’uninfected (well)’, and
‘dropped’ state are shown in Table 2. QALYs for each state were obtained from
existing research(109,124).
Cycle times of 1 month or 1 year are generally used in Markov model for chronic
diseases (53). Although 1 year can be used for HIV(61), IDUs can drop out of the
interventions sooner. Therefore, a cycle length of 1 month is more appropriate for
this model. Since each cycle in the model is 1 month, these transition probabilities
were adjusted for a monthly base.
The prevalence rates of each intervention were obtained from previous research
that calculated the rates considering needle sharing between IDUs, condom use and
sexual behaviours(124).The dropout rates at each cycle, for each intervention, were
obtained from existing research(110,131) [table 2].
2.4.4 Costs
Cost data were collected from GFATM website (www.theglobalfund.org). GFATM’s
intervention in the Ukraine includes various harm-reduction packages (7). In addition,
other interventions were carried out simultaneously including public health education
campaigns around harm reduction for IDUs, and other complementary activities. As
a result, the exact proportion allocated to the combined intervention is not clear. For
the purposes of this analysis then, it was conservatively assumed that all budgets for
Round 6 (2006-2010) were used for the combined intervention, although OST alone
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and the combined intervention was simultaneously implemented. This limitation in
the cost data will be tested with sensitivity analysis.
The summarized grant data for the Ukraine is presented in Table 3-a. Costs per
cycle were estimated based on the summarized data in Table 3-b, which describe
how the harm reduction interventions of NSP and OST were conducted for 5 years.
The variable cost of NSP for each cycle in the Ukraine comprises disposable
syringes, needles, disinfectant solutions, and alcohol wipes(105). The variable cost
of OST is from the WHO medical database, using the price from Pharmascience.inc
(105).
Costs were incurred in United States dollars (USD) and adjusted for inflation to
2011 values using the consumer price index (CPI) for the Ukraine from the World
Bank [ref]. All costs other than the variable costs of NSP and OST were classified as
start-up costs (Table 3-b), which are generated at each Markov cycle of 1 month
irrespective of the number of patients. The information regarding the total number of
patients to calculate a cost per patient was obtained from GFATM website(135) and
is presented in Table 2.
It was conservatively assumed that the variable cost of the combined strategy is
simply the sum of the variable costs for NSP and OST.
Staff costs and other delivery costs were included in start-up costs for each cycle.
The variable costs of each intervention were annualised. Indirect costs, such as
productivity loss, were not taken into account in this study and noted as a limitation
of this analysis.
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TABLE 3: COST DATA
a) Grant data Summary
Intervention Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Total
Ukraine Harm reduction_syringe 522,600 1,372,411 1,901,061 1,900,411 1,951,061 7,647,544
Substitution therapy 1,127,125 1,443,544 3,099,845 3,194,531 3,395,208 12,260,253
*USD
b) Cost per cycle
Cost per 1 cycle NSP OST Combined
Starting up cost 99750.73 58337.55 14023.91
Cost per patient 2.52 29.20 31.72
Total cost per 1 cycle
Cost per patient 11.59 40.87 34.06
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2.4.5 Discounting, Perspective and Time horizon
The intervention’s benefits were evaluated over the duration of the grant period i.e.
from the start of 2002 to the end of 2006. Annualized costs were used for each year.
As the World Health Organisation (WHO) recommended, an identical discount rate
of 3% was applied to both costs and effectiveness. A provider perspective was
applied.
2.4.6 Population
Using data from the literature, it was assumed that half of IDUs attending the
interventions were infected at the outset (25,124) [Table 2] and the average age was
assumed to be 39 (136).
2.5 Results
The results of the Markov Monte Carlo simulation are given with 95% confidence
intervals in Table 4. The result of costs and effectiveness of deterministic analysis is
located within the confidence interval of probabilistic analysis, showing the
robustness of the result regarding the parameters for this model.
Combined therapy of NSP and OST averted the most infections (1848 HIV
infections averted). After this, OST alone averted the most infections (1053 HIV
infections averted). Combined therapy averted more infections than the sum of OST
alone and NSP alone (1848 HIV infection averted vs 1559 HIV infection averted).
Considering QALY gains, combined therapy still gained most (4183.5 QALYs). After
this, NSP alone gained slightly more QALYs than OST alone (2970 QALYs vs 2599
QALYs).
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Although combined therapy strictly dominated in terms of benefits, NSP alone was
most cost effective at $487.4/infection averted and $83.3/QALY gained compared
with combined therapy of NSP and OST together at $851.6/infection averted and
$373.7/QALYs (table 4). OST alone had the highest cost effectiveness ratios at
$1145.9/infection averted and $459.9/QALYs.
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TABLE 4 : 10,000 TIMES MONTE CARLO SIMULATION RESULTS AND A DETERMINISTIC RESULT OF COST AND EFFECTIVENESS
Infection averted Monte Carlo Simulation Deterministic
Combined NSP OST combined NSP OST
Cost 1,574,559.00 247,108.68 1,206,760.80 1,565,967.17 247,148.20 1,199,134.00
Std 580,415.89 67,045.82 419,480.75
Upper CI(95%) 1,585,935.20 248,422.78 1,214,982.60
Lower CI(95%) 1,563,182.90 245,794.58 1,198,539.00
Effect 1,848.76 506.98 1,053.10 1,848.74 506.98 1,053.03
Std 6.78 5.33 5.39
Upper CI(95%) 1,848.89 507.08 1,053.21
Lower CI(95%) 1,848.63 506.88 1,052.99
CE 851.68 487.41 1,145.91 847.05 487.49 1,138.75
Std 95.06 54.01 128.57
Upper CI(95%) 853.55 488.47 1,148.43
Lower CI(95%) 849.82 486.35 1,143.39
QALY
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Combined NSP OST combined NSP OST
Cost 1,563,571.10 247,577.10 1,195,319.80 1,565,967.17 247,148.20 1,199,134.00
Std 579,705.31 66,864.85 418,960.03
Upper CI(95%) 1,574,933.30 248,887.65 1,203,531.40
Lower CI(95%) 1,552,208.90 246,266.55 1,187,108.10
Effect 4,183.51 2,970.21 2,599.08 4,183.51 2,970.21 2,599.04
Std 7.47 5.69 5.71
Upper CI(95%) 4,183.66 2,970.32 2,599.19
Lower CI(95%) 4,183.36 2,970.10 2,598.97
CE 373.75 83.35 459.90 374.32 83.21 461.38
Std 95.06 54.01 128.57
Upper CI(95%) 374.57 83.55 460.93
Lower CI(95%) 372.92 83.15 458.87
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2.5.1 Sensitivity analysis
The costs of combined NSP and OST are uncertain due to the limitations of the
cost data, which do not explicitly state the total costs of the combined intervention.
Consequently, one-way sensitivity analysis was conducted to relax this limitation.
The uncertainty of both effectiveness and costs was examined using PSA.The three
strategies were compared with a single therapy in Table 5.
Irrespective of the variation in the starting costs of combined intervention, the
results are consistent at both outcome measures. It was found that the variation in
the start up costs of combined intervention did not affect the rank of strategies in
terms of ICER. Although the ICER of combined intervention varies between $428
and $461/infection averted, the rank of ICER for each intervention did not change.
Similarly, when presented in QALYs, the ICER of each intervention did not change
regardless of the variation in starting up costs.
On the other hand, it was found that the variable cost of OST can affect the
relative rank of strategies. At the lower end of OST, OST was most cost effective
strategy at both QALYs and infection averted. The ICER of combined intervention
[$428-$461/infection averted] was slightly lower than the ICER of NSP
[$487/infection averted] although NSP alone is more cost effective. This results from
the fact that OST has ‘extended dominance’ in terms of HIV infections averted and
so combined intervention was compared with OST instead of NSP.
In brief, this result relaxes the uncertainty in the start up cost of combined
intervention, and offers supporting evidence that the combined intervention and NSP
alone are preferred strategies to OST alone. Also, the high variable cost of OST
makes OST alone,a less cost effective strategy.
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TABLE 5: SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
Averted Lowerend ICER CI(95%)
Higher
End ICER CI(95%) Comparator
Variable_NSP Nointervention 0.00 0.00 2.52 0.00
Variable_NSP NSP 0.00 296.71 293.40:298.60 2.52 487.49 484.89:490.09 vs nointervention
Variable_NSP OST 0.00 1920.53 1911.68:1929.38 2.52 1743.40 1734.55:1752.25 vs NSP
Variable_NSP NSP and OST 0.00 461.01 452.98:469.04 2.52 461.01 452.98:469.04 vs OST
Variable_OST Nointervention 0.00 0.00 29.20 0.00
Variable_OST OST 0.00 83.17 82.73:83.61 29.20 1743.40 1734.55:1752.25 vs NSP
Variable_OST NSP 0.00 -292.22 (-294.6): (-289.4) 29.20 487.49 484.89:490.09 vs nointervention
Variable_OST NSP and OST 0.00 1857.95 29.20 461.01 452.98:469.04 vs OST
startingcost_NSP Nointervention 0.00 0.00 99750.75 0.00
startingcost_NSP NSP 0.00 190.78 187.4:192.6 99750.75 487.49 484.89:490.09 vs nointervention
startingcost_NSP OST 0.00 2018.89 2009.95:2027.65 99750.75 1743.40 1734.55:1752.25 vs NSP
startingcost_NSP NSP and OST 0.00 461.01 452.98:469.04 99750.75 461.01 452.98:469.04 vs OST
startingcost_combin
ed
No
intervention 0.00 0.00 14023.92 0.00
49
startingcost_combin
ed NSP 0.00 487.49 484.89:490.09 14023.92 487.49 484.89:490.09
vs no
intervention
startingcost_combin
ed OST 0.00 1743.40 1734.55:1752.25 14023.92 1743.40 1734.55:1752.25 vs NSP
startingcost_combin
ed NSP and OST 0.00 428.49 419.96:436.03 14023.92 461.01 452.98:469.04 vs OST
startingcost_OST Nointervention 0.00 0.00 58337.53 0.00
startingcost_OST NSP 0.00 487.49 484.89:490.09 58337.53 487.49 484.89:490.09 vs nointervention
startingcost_OST OST 0.00 1583.01 1574.15:1591.85 58337.53 1743.40 1734.55:1752.25 vs NSP
startingcost_OST NSP and OST 0.00 571.08 562.97:579.03 58337.53 461.01 452.98:469.04 vs OST
QALYs
Variable_NSP Nointervention 0.00 0.00 2.52 0.00
Variable_NSP NSP 0.00 50.65 50.2:51.08 2.52 83.21 82.76:83.65 vs nointervention
Variable_NSP OST 0.00 -2825.37 (-2836.71):(-2793.29) 2.52 -2564.79 (-2585.71):(-2542.29) vs NSP
Variable_NSP NSP and OST 0.00 1166.69 1150.94:1181.07 2.52 1086.97 1077.76:1096.24 vs NSP
Variable_OST Nointervention 0.00 0.00 29.20 0.00
Variable_OST OST 0.00 33.70 30.63:36.75 29.20 83.21 79.94:86.06 vs nointervention
Variable_OST NSP 0.00 429.90 419.96:436.03 29.20 -2564.79 (-2585.71):(-2542.29) vs OST
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Variable_OST NSP and OST 0.00 1086.97 1077.76:1096.24 29.20 1086.97 1077.76:1096.24 vs NSP
startingcost_combin
ed
No
intervention 0.00 0.00 14023.92 0.00
startingcost_combin
ed NSP 0.00 83.21 82.76:83.65 14023.92 83.21 82.76:83.65
vs no
intervention
startingcost_combin
ed OST 0.00 -2564.79 (-2585.71):(-2542.29) 14023.92 -2564.79 (-2585.71):(-2542.29) vs NSP
startingcost_combin
ed NSP and OST 0.00 1065.64 1049.93:1080.07 14023.92 1086.97 1077.76:1096.24 vs NSP
startingcost_NSP Nointervention 0.00 0.00 99750.75 0.00
startingcost_NSP NSP 0.00 32.56 29.49:35.62 99750.75 83.21 82.76:83.65 vs nointervention
startingcost_NSP OST 0.00 -2970.06 (-2991.71):(-2948.29) 99750.75 -2564.79 (-2585.71):(-2542.29) vs NSP
startingcost_NSP NSP and OST 0.00 1210.95 1194.93:1225.06 99750.75 1086.97 1077.76:1096.24 vs NSP
startingcost_OST Nointervention 0.00 0.00 58337.53 0.00
startingcost_OST NSP 0.00 83.21 82.76:83.65 58337.53 83.21 82.76:83.65 vs nointervention
startingcost_OST OST 0.00 -2328.83 (-2350.54):(-2307.12) 58337.53 -2564.79 (-2585.71):(-2542.29) vs NSP
startingcost_OST NSP and OST 0.00 1086.97 1077.76:1096.24 58337.53 1086.97 1077.76:1096.24 vs NSP
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2.5.2 Probability sensitivity analysis
Figure 2 and 3 shows the results of probabilistic sensitivity analysis with 95%
confidence interval using Monte-Carlo simulation.
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FIGURE 2: THE RESULT OF PROBABILISTIC SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS(HIV INFECTION AVERTED, WTP=GDP PER CAPITA OF THE UKRAINE)
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FIGURE 3: THE RESULT OF PROBABILISTIC SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS (QALYS, WTP=GDP OF THE UKRAINE)
54
The result of combined intervention vs NSP alone is located in the first quadrant,
suggesting that the combined intervention is incrementally cost effective compared
with NSP alone. However, the results indicate that the combined intervention may in
fact cost less than OST as a single therapy and therefore be the dominant strategy
when compared with OST: 31% of results are in the fourth (south east) quadrant.
This means that the probability that the combined intervention is more effective at
higher cost, in terms of infection averted, than OST alone is 69 % (first quadrant).
Irrespective of the outcome measures, the combined intervention is located below
the line of willingness to pay (WTP) for the Ukraine.
2.6 Discussion
In this paper, an updated systematic review of the cost-effectiveness of harm
reduction highlighted a gap in existing evidence: the lack of an incremental approach
to comparing the cost effectiveness of combined versus mono-therapy. To fill the
evidence gap, this study has attempted to determine the cost-effectiveness of harm
reduction by GFATM in the Ukraine. A Markov Monte Carlo Model was used to
conduct n incremental economic analysis comparing 3 harm-reduction interventions
with one another and with no intervention; i.e. NSP alone, OST alone and combined
OST and NSP.
The analysis found that all interventions were cost effective in terms of QALYs
gained and HIV infections averted. NSP alone was the most cost effective and OST
alone was the least cost effective option. While combined therapy did not have the
lowest cost effectiveness ratio, it was significantly more effective in both outcome
measures than any alternative. The relatively high variable cost of OST ($31.72 per
patient per cycle) explains, to a large extent, why the combined strategy is not as
cost effective as NSP alone.
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The result that NSP is most cost-effective, is consistent with previous research on
harm-reduction (117,124). NSP alone [$83.35/QALY in Table 4] is shown to be more
cost-effective in the Ukraine than in Australia [$416–8,750/QALY] (119) or
Kazakhstan [$132–147/QALY] (137). However, the cost effectiveness ratio of NSP
alone in this study, at $487.41 per HIV infection averted, is significantly higher than
that from another study in the Ukraine study [$97–162 per HIV infection averted]
(124). OST, at $459.90 per QALY, was slightly more cost-effective than other
analyses for the Ukraine suggest [$530/QALY] (117). Regardless, OST was a
dominated strategy for both outcome measures and this is attributed to the high
variable cost of OST. The results of the sensitivity analysis support this conclusion.
From the result of PSA, the samples are located below the slope of willingness to
pay (WTP). Considering that the GDP of the Ukraine was $3,615 in 2011(132), all
three interventions were found to be located below the cost effectiveness threshold
suggested by the WHO (129). As a result, and given the significant dominance of
combined therapy in terms of benefits, this is may be the preferred strategy in the
Ukraine context. That said, a discussion about affordability and the ethics of
selecting a less effective strategy may be warranted in this context.
Some caveats exist in this study and the generalizability of the findings, which
should be noted. Firstly, the start-up costs of combined intervention are uncertain.
This makes it more important to measure uncertainty and sensitivity in costs.
Likewise, probability of transmission used in this study assumes normal IDUs.
However, depending on the IDUs status such as sex workers or men sex with men
(MSM), the probability will be varied. Another caution is that the effectiveness
parameters, such as drop-out rates, will vary depending on how an intervention is
implemented in practice. Therefore, the ‘dominance’ of each strategy over
comparators should be carefully interpreted.
More detail on the number of IDUs reached by Global Fund NSP and OST
programs would further improve the accuracy of estimates. With more evidence
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regarding the effectiveness of harm reduction programs, including those supported
by GFATM, greater support for effective – and cost effective - harm reduction can be
fostered.
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3 Socioeconomic equity in HIV testing
in Malawi5
5 This chapter was published in Global Health Action on Oct 2016. The published
article is attached in the Appendix. Due to the request from the journal, the structure
of this chapter is slightly different from the published paper.
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3.1 Introduction
Malawi has a generalised, high-level HIV epidemic. An estimated 1,100,000
people were living with HIV in 2012, approximately 11% of the total population (103).
Malawi’s HIV prevalence is representative of other countries in the southern and
eastern regions of sub-Saharan Africa including Botswana and South Africa (41).
In 2013, UNAIDS set the ‘90:90:90 goals’ to mobilise the global response to HIV.
According to these goals, by 2020; ninety percent of people living with HIV should be
aware of their HIV status, ninety percent of those known to be HIV positive should be
on treatment and ninety percent of people on treatment should be virally suppressed
(138). Malawi is one of five countries in which less than one in 10 HIV-exposed
children obtained early infant diagnostic services along with Angola, Chad, the
Democratic Republic of Congo and Nigeria among 21 priority countries (138). In
2014, only 40% of men in Malawi aged 15-49 had received an HIV test in the
previous 12 months despite the generalized nature of the epidemic (139). A better
understanding of testing and diagnosis in the Malawian context is thus critical to the
achievement of the 90:90:90 goals. Without access to testing, diagnosis and
treatment cannot follow.
Receipt of an HIV test in Malawi is likely to be determined by both need and non-
need factors. Gravelle et al. (140) discuss the definition of health equity as “Equal
Treatment for Equal Need”, according to which, need variables should affect use of
health service and non-need variables should not. Need variables thus reflect heath
status, while non- need variables tend to reflect socioeconomic status such as
wealth or education. Key findings of the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS)
2010 show that HIV prevalence in Malawi is three times higher for men in the highest
income group than men in the lowest income group (88). HIV prevalence among
urban residents is also greater than in rural areas. For example, urban men are
almost twice as likely to be infected as rural men. A similar pattern is observed
among women; 11.2% of women living in urban areas are HIV positive, compared to
3.7% in rural areas (88). This suggests that the need for HIV testing may not be
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equally distributed across the population in Malawi. These figures should however,
be interpreted with caution; firstly, because the calculation of prevalence rates may
be affected by the intensity of testing for HIV; and secondly, although rural
prevalence may be lower, the absolute number of people living with HIV may be
greater in rural areas where the majority of the Malawian population reside.
While a number of studies demonstrate that HIV test uptake varies by socio-
demographic and economic characteristics (41,80,141–143), there is a lack of
evidence about whether there is equal access for equal need in Malawi. In general,
equal treatment for equal need is referred to as horizontal equity (144). ‘Equal
access for equal need’ means that patients who have an equal need for a health
service, make equal use of care without being disproportionately affected by non-
need factors such as socioeconomic status (144).Furthermore, there is little
evidence regarding rural-urban differences in HIV testing in Malawi, despite the fact
that urbanity is one of the major socioeconomic factors widely employed in inequity
studies (86,145,146).
Most studies of access to HIV testing have taken either an urban or rural focus,
and have tended to focus on single or clustered districts (78,147). These study
designs preclude urban-rural comparisons and analyses of geographic variation at
the national level. For example, Yoder et al. (78) carried out qualitative research on
access to HIV testing in Malawi using data from four study sites in Blantyre,
Chiradzulu, Lilongwe and Dowa districts. They explored the reasons why people in
those sites sought an HIV test and found that most women receiving an HIV test
were worried about HIV infection from their partners. Helleringer et al. (147) studied
the uptake of home-based testing in rural areas including 6 villages of Likoma Island
and found that uptake was highest among the poorest groups.
Currently, there is lack of information regarding equity in HIV testing at a national
scale in Malawi. As such, our understanding of the likely barriers to achieving global
goals in Malawi remains incomplete. No study of HIV testing uptake that we could
60
identify was carried out on a national sample, none studied inequity using standard
tools such as the concentration index, and no study has yet explored the
determinants of inequity in HIV testing in Malawi. These results highlight the paucity
of evidence on inequity in HIV testing uptake in Malawi.
This study aims to assess horizontal inequity in HIV testing at the national level in
Malawi.
3.2 Literature review
A literature review was carried out regarding the topic of ‘HIV test in Malawi’ and
‘equity in HIV test’. No restriction on published year was imposed, and only
English-language articles were taken into consideration. The literature review was
conducted using 2 databases: Web of Science and PubMed. Studies were
retrieved through Web of Science with following terms: Malawi, HIV test,
socioeconomic, and equity. The keywords Malawi and HIV test identified 583
studies. After refining the search result with equity, only 5 studies remained
(Appendix 1). Expanding the result with the keyword socioeconomic, 13 studies
obtained. After combining with previous result and excluding duplicated results, 16
studies remained. Considering relevance to the purpose of the chapter (2 articles
from other country, 6 articles not about HIV test) excluded 8 more. Among the 8
that were left, 2 were about costs of HIV (148) and identifying risk group (149).
One was about socioeconomic status and HIV prevalence (150) and 1 was based
on a qualitative interview (151). Hence, from the 8 studies, 4 articles were chosen
(147,152–154).
Eleven articles were identified with same keywords through PubMed (Appendix
2). However, all of these were irrelevant to the research topic. Among them, 2
were duplicates identified by Web of Science (149,153), and so eliminated. 3 by
Streatfield et al. (155–157) were not about HIV test or Malawi. Two were just
overviews about HIV (158,159). One was qualitative research (160) and 3 were
about other disease such as mental health, food security, and paediatric care
(161–163).
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Finally hand search on Google Scholar using identical keywords to the above
added 5 (40,41,78,143,164). In total, 9 articles from Web of Science and Google
Scholar were included.
Among the identified papers, 4 focused on the gender inequity in HIV testing.
Conroy (152) examined how relationships between men and women in families
affect young people’s decisions to test for HIV in rural Malawi. They found
women’s testing were more strongly influenced by perceptions of a partner’s risk
on HIV than their women’s own decision while men decided HIV testing based on
self-assessments.
Makwiza et al. (154) carried out the synthesis of published and unpublished
reports to see equity on voluntary counselling and testing (VCT) in Malawi. They
found an urban bias in provision of HIV testing and counselling, which more
women than men used.
Weinreb et al. (41) examined women’s access to HIV test using the data of
Malawi Diffusion and Ideation Change Project (MDICP). They argued that
substituting home-based for clinic-based testing may reduce the gap in inequality
between those tested and those who cannot be. They also found less demand for
HIV testing from the poorer and less educated in Malawi.
Obare et al. (40) examined the acceptance of repeat population-based voluntary
counselling and testing (VCT) for HIV in rural Malawi. They argued that women are
more likely to be stigmatised about seeking to be tested for HIV than men.
Two papers studied equity in rural areas of Malawi. Helleringer et al. (147)
measured uptake of home-based HIV testing and counselling and estimated HIV
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prevalence for residents of 6 villages of Likoma Island, Malawi. They found that
HIV testing and counselling uptake was high during a home-based HIV testing and
counselling campaign on Likoma Island, particularly among the poorest groups.
Thornton et al. (79) found that only 8% of rural Malawians received voluntary
counselling and testing (VCT), while 74% had never been tested for VCT, using
the data from the Malawi Diffusion and Ideational Change Project (MDICP). This
study implies the equity study of HIV patients in African countries encounters
fundamental issues.
Mitchell et al. (153) conducted a household survey of 24,069 people regarding
HIV testing and access in African countries: Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi,
Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and
Zimbabwe. They found males received significantly more HIV test than females in
Malawi, South Africa and Tanzania.
Yoder et al. (78) carried out demographic research regarding HIV test in Malawi
using Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) data; however, this research
focuses on neither equity nor geographical variation of access.
Ziwa et al. (164) evaluated whether and technical support provided by Umoyo
Network to Malawi AIDS Counselling & Resource Organization (MACRO) has
significantly increased the quality and availability of voluntary counselling and
testing at MACRO in Malawi. They concluded that the overall institutional capacity
and quality of voluntary counselling and testing service delivery at Malawi AIDS
Counselling & Resource Organization (MACRO) was improved but raised
concerns about privacy and confidentiality, clients having to travel long distances
for voluntary counselling and testing services, and insufficient funds.
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In summary, these studies show an evidence gap. They did not approach the
equity in HIV test using needs and non-needs variables to see horizontal equity in
Malawi. It would be appropriate to carry out an analysis on socioeconomic inequity
in HIV test at Malawi using concentration index to estimate the inequity related to
HIV testing and to make up this limitation.
3.3 Methods
This study calculates a decomposed concentration index (39) of access to HIV
testing in Malawi. While the concentration index quantifies the extent of any inequity,
the decomposition method explores the determinants of inequity; that is, the
contribution of different health need and non-need factors to any inequity identified in
the concentration index. Common indicators of non-need variation in the literature
include socio-economic status such as income (165). In this study, need factors
include symptoms of sexually transmitted infections, while non-need factors include
wealth, education, literacy, and marriage status. ‘Need factors’ here reflect the need
for health service use. Common indicators of need used in other studies include
demographic variables such as age and gender, and measures of health status
(165). As the variable measuring uptake of HIV testing is binary (“Have you ever
been tested for HIV?”), a probit model is used in the regression stage within the
concentration index (39).
A standard decomposition index (39) is not sufficient to measure horizontal
inequity in HIV test uptake in sub-Saharan African settings such as Malawi because
of the complex relationship between HIV risk and socio-economic status. In this
context, as mentioned previously, wealthier groups have higher HIV prevalence
(166,167). This appears to contradict findings from other settings, that poorer groups
are more at risk of HIV (146,166,168) and may be a consequence of the fact that
prevalence estimates are derived from testing outcomes, and access to testing may
be skewed towards higher wealth groups (41). As such, a standard (pooled)
concentration index for HIV testing is likely to non-randomly underestimate need and
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thus inequity between wealth groups as it does not properly capture different need in
different wealth groups (86).
This paper therefore applies a decomposition index method developed by Van de
Poel et al. (86) in which the contribution of need variables in a decomposition index
is broken up into two parts, labelled ‘corrected need’ and ‘discrimination’,
respectively. Corrected need explores whether corrected, need adjusted horizontal
inequity is underestimated or not, given the pooled group. Discrimination explores
how the health service use for a given need in a group compares with a reference
group.
This method for estimating corrected need is distinguished from traditional
decomposition methods by the use of a reference group that is expected to realise
vertical equity (86). Vertical equity implies individuals with different levels of needs
‘appropriately’ consuming different amounts of health care (140). Van de poel et al.
(86) suggest that the highest wealth quintile is the reference group, while the pooled
group is the whole population. Accordingly, this method captures variation in need
and health service use between the reference and pooled groups - horizontal
inequity - enabling us to extract the hidden vertical inequity that cannot be seen with
conventional decomposition methods.
3.3.1 Calculation of the concentration index, corrected need and horizontal
inequity
A concentration index is generally calculated as
    = 2   (  ,  )  (1)
where CIy is the concentration index for health service use y,    is health service
use for individual i, μ is the mean of health service use, and R  is individual i’s
fractional socio-economic rank.
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We assume that health service use is determined by a set of k independent
variables (x )
y = α +   β 
 
x  + ε (2)
where β  is a vector of coefficients and ε is the error term. Then the concentration
index for health service use can be expressed as
CI =  β x  
μ
C 
 
+ GC /  (3)
where x   is the mean of the independent variable x  and C  is the concentration
index of x . GC  is the generalized concentration index for the error term, which is the
remaining unexplained socioeconomic inequality in the model (39).
Equation (3) consists of two parts: the explained part and the unexplained part.
The explained part is made up of two elements: the concentration index for the
independent variable (C ) and a measure of elasticity (      ). Elasticity (      ) is the
impact of each independent variable on health service use. That is to say, elasticity
shows how much the dependent variable changes when one unit of the independent
variable is changed. The CI in equation (3) represents the extent to which the
determinants of health service use are unequally distributed across wealth groups.
Bearing this in mind, the standard decomposition index including need and non-
need variables is as follows.
CI = ∑     ̅   
  
+ ∑      ̅   
  
+ GC /  (4)
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where x  and z  are vectors of independent need and non-need variables,
respectively.   
  and   
  are the regression coefficients of    and    for the pooled
group on health service use from (2). x   and z   are the means of    and   
respectively. GC  is again the generalized concentration index for the error term and
μ is the mean of health service use. Conceptually, the first term on the right-hand
side is the contribution of need variables ( ̅ ) to the whole CI (“need contribution”),
and the second term is the contribution of non-need variables (  ̅) to the whole CI
(“non-need contribution”), taking into account both the elasticity and the
concentration index of the independent variables. This is an extension of equation (3)
above.
Jones and Ropez (169) then introduced another form of standard decomposition
based on equation (4) as follows.
CI =      ̅   
 
 
+ 2
  
     
 
     −   
       −
12 
 
+      ̅  
 
 
+ 2
  
         −   
       −
12 
  
+ 2
 
   (  ,  ) + 2     (  ,  )
(5)
In this specification, the first and third terms are referred to as the homogeneous
contributions, and the second and fourth terms as the heterogeneous contributions,
of need and non-need variables to the CI, respectively. The homogeneous
contribution terms assume that the effects are the same across wealth groups. The
second and fourth terms are the covariance between the regression coefficients and
the socioeconomic rank (Ri) of individual i in wealth group g. These terms represent
the heterogeneous contribution of the coefficient of the pooled values for need and
non-need variables, respectively. The fifth term corresponds to the covariance
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between the fractional rank and group intercepts, and means the contribution of
group differences in health service use to SES associated inequality. The sixth term
is the remaining unexplained inequality in health service use (169).
3.3.2 Corrected need and horizontal inequity
Van de Poel et al. (86) split the second term in equation (5) into two parts and
label them ‘corrected need’ and ‘discrimination’, respectively. This method is
distinguished from traditional decomposition methods by employing a reference
group as a way of incorporating normative choice.
In this method, an asset index is used to split the population into wealth groups,
and coefficient estimates from a pooled regression are compared with coefficient
estimates from a regression using only the highest wealth group. The highest wealth
group is expected to achieve higher levels of access in a use-need relationship (86).
The ‘corrected need’ component of the CI can then be obtained after splitting the
heterogeneous contributions of need and non-need variables into two parts: the
corrected need effect, and discrimination (86). The decomposition index can thus be
disaggregated as follows:
CI =      ̅   
 
 
+ 2
  
       −   
  
 
    
 
    −
12 + 2
  
          −      
 
    −
12 
 +      ̅  
 
 
+ 2
  
         −   
       −
12 
  + 2
 
   (  ,  ) + 2     (   ,  )
(6)
Where     ,     are the parameters from the original model (4).      is the
coefficient from the reference (high wealth) group.     is the coefficient from a wealth
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quintile subgroup other than the reference group. The first and fourth terms are the
homogeneous contributions from the standard decomposition and identical to the
first and third terms in (5), respectively. As previously explained, the second and
third terms are referred to as ‘corrected need’ and ‘discrimination’, respectively.
These terms are the main difference from equation (5).
The second term of equation (6) is the contribution of corrected need to the CI:
2
  
       −   
  
 
    
 
    −
12  (7)
Where     −    is the difference between the parameter estimates from the
reference group and the pooled population regressions respectively,     is a need
variable of individual i, and   is the mean of health service use. N is the total
population and Ri is the fractional rank of individual i. Corrected need will be positive
if the reference group uses more health services and need is also concentrated more
on this group. Likewise, corrected need will be negative if the highest wealth group
uses more health services but need is more concentrated on the poorest wealth
group.
In general, unstandardized horizontal inequity (HI) is estimated by subtracting the
contribution of need variables from the concentration index:
   =   −      ̅   
 
 
   
(8)
So, horizontal inequity is higher, the higher is the contribution of non-need
variables to the concentration index.
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Corrected need-adjusted horizontal inequity (86) is calculated by subtracting the
contributions of both need and corrected need from CI:
   =    −      ̅   
 
 
   
−
2
  
       −   
  
 
    
 
    −
12  (9)
Horizontal inequity will be lower if corrected need is positive, and vice versa. We
do not have to consider Van de Poel’s discrimination term because discrimination is
effectively captured on the right-hand side of equation (9) as a result of the
estimation of horizontal inequity, given equation (6).
Wealth, as measured by an asset index, is included as a non-need variable in the
decomposition approach. The decomposition analysis shows the contribution of each
need and non-need factor to the pooled CI as shown in equations (1) and (2). The
concentration index depends on the relationship between the rank of socioeconomic
status and the health or other non-need variable, and not on the variation in the
socio-economic status variable itself (39). When a socio-economic or wealth variable
is included, as shown in equation (4), the CI of wealth is calculated using the
covariance between the individual’s level of wealth and their wealth rank Ri (see (1)).
Based on the given sample weight, individuals with the same level of wealth may
have a different rank in DHS data (170). By definition, the CI of richer wealth
quintiles are positive while the CI of poorer quintiles are negative (86). In practice,
when equity studies using decomposition analysis include the CI of ‘wealth’ in the
non-need factors (39,86,146,171), the focus is on the contribution of the wealth
variable to the total CI, rather than on interpreting the CI of the wealth variable itself.
For example, Wagstaff et al. (171) calculated a CI with the covariance between
stunting and household consumption expenditure. In that study, the CI of household
consumption expenditure was included as a non-need factor in the decomposition
analysis. Once the CI of a ‘wealth’ variable is calculated, it is possible to estimate the
contribution of wealth to the pooled CI because the contribution is the product of
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elasticity and the CI of each variable. Therefore, the inclusion of wealth in the
decomposition analysis does not constitute ‘double counting’.
Rural-urban inequality can be measured using a method similar to that described
above. For the purposes of this study, a regional concentration index was calculated
using the standard decomposition method, following steps in the equations (1) - (4).
To compare rural and urban areas, a concentration index was calculated by
estimating the covariance between each need variable, non-need variable, and the
wealth rank of people living in the area. A single asset index comprising five quintiles
was developed for the whole of Malawi, without distinguishing between rural and
urban areas (172).
To estimate the coefficients used in the decomposed concentration index, a probit
model was used (39). A probit model allows the estimation of probabilities or
marginal effects, imposing a normal distribution on the data (173). The mean of need
variables and coefficents of the probit model were compared using a t test for
continuous variables and a chi-2 test for categorical variables. All tests were
conducted at the 95% confidence level.
3.3.3 Data
Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) are designed to collect national health
and demographic data (172). Topics in the survey include fertility, contraception,
breastfeeding, family planning, nutritional status of mothers and children, childhood
illnesses and mortality, use of maternal and child health services, maternal mortality,
and domestic violence (88,172). In addition, DHS 2004 and DHS 2010 in Malawi
collected detailed HIV-related data including knowledge of and attitudes towards
HIV/AIDS, receipt of an HIV test, HIV-related behavioural Indicators, HIV status and
symptoms of sexually transmitted infections (STIs). The DHS in Malawi also tested a
sub sample of respondents for HIV. The age of the respondents ranges from 15 to
49 for women and from 15 to 54 for men (88).
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This study uses data from two rounds of the DHS survey in Malawi – the 2004
round, and the 2010 round. This enables the calculation of within year inequity and
a comparison of trends in inequity between these two periods. Then 2004 data used
in this study includes 15,091 households, 11,698 women aged 15- 49 and 3,261
men aged 15-54. The 2010 dataset includes 27,000 households, 24,000 women
and 7,000 men. Both samples were drawn over 522 clusters: 458 in rural areas and
64 in urban areas (172). Malawi is divided into 11 districts in the DHS: Blantyre,
Kasungu, Machinga, Mangochi, Mzimba, Salima, Thyolo, Zomba, Lilongwe, Mulanje,
and other districts. Based on the FAO classification (174), Lilongwe, Mzimba,
Blantyre, and Zomba were classified as urban areas in the DHS.
A probability sample, which is defined as one in which the units are selected
randomly with known and nonzero probabilities, was used in the DHS data collection
(175). Households were pre-selected in the central office before the start of data
collection (175). Trained field staff conducted interviews only the pre- selected
households to avoid bias. Sample size was determined based on the calculation of
sample size using relative standard error. Further details on the DHS sampling
methodology can be found elsewhere (175).
The dependent variable in these analyses is ‘Ever tested for HIV’. This takes the
value of ‘1’ if the respondent has ever tested for HIV and ‘0’ if they have never tested.
Three questions on experience of STI symptoms in DHS 2010 and DHS 2004 are
used as need variables in the analysis: 1) a diagnosed STI in the last 12 months; 2)
a genital sore or ulcer in the last 12 months; or 3) genital discharge in the last 12
months. A number of previous studies have used symptoms as need indicators in
empirical analyses of equity (176,177). The symptoms used in this study may be
indicators of HIV infection (178) and patients should be referred for an HIV test when
these symptoms are observed (178,179). The presence of STIs also increases the
possibility of transmitting HIV (142). Socioeconomic status variables were selected
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as non-need variables including wealth as measured by an asset index, literacy,
education, and marital status.
No ethical approval was needed for the conduct of this study as it makes use of
open-access secondary data.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 HIV test uptake in 2010
Table 6 describes HIV test uptake by socioeconomic status in 2010. The data
reveal significant differences in HIV testing by socioeconomic status, especially
among men. Three-quarters (74.5%) of women and over half (53.7%) of all men
report that they have been tested for HIV. In terms of region, literacy, education,
marriage and wealth, those who have been tested are significantly different from
those who have not been tested (P <0.05). Testing is about 10 percentage points
more common in the Northern region (79.2% among women and 61.6% among men)
than in the Central region, and men in the Southern region are also lagging behind
(52.3%). Literate women and men have more often been tested, but the gap is small
for women, while it is relatively large for men: 43.4% of illiterate men and 57.1% of
men who can read a whole sentence have received an HIV test. The difference
between primary and secondary education is relatively small for women (73.5% vs.
79.3%) but large for men (48.3% vs. 67.7%). The gap in HIV testing by wealth
quintile is smaller than the gap by education: 72.1% of the poorest women and 49.7%
of the poorest men have been tested, compared with 76% of the richest women and
59.9% of the richest men. There is very little difference between never married
(mostly young) women and men (40.2% and 42.5% respectively); however, the
difference between married and never married women is much larger (43 percentage
points) than the difference between married and never married men (18 percentage
points). Widowed and divorced women report lower levels of testing than women in a
relationship (whether married, living together or not living together). Few men are
divorced, widowed or not living together in this context. These results show that
higher SES and the uptake of HIV testing have a positive association.
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TABLE 6: HIV TESTING BY SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS (DHS 2010)
Women Men
Not Tested
(N=5788)
(% not tested)
Tested
(N=16928)
(% tested)
P
value
Not Tested
(N=3293)
(% not tested)
Tested
(N=3821)
(% tested)
P
value
Region Northern 858(20.8) 3275(79.2) <0.001 491(38.4) 789(61.6) <0.001
Central 2360(30.4) 5399(69.6) 1248(48.4) 1329(51.6)
Southern 2570(23.7) 8254(76.3) 1554(47.7) 1703(52.3)
Literacy Cannot read at all 1930(26.7) 5305(73.3) 0.014 788(56.6) 604(43.4) <0.001
Able to read only parts of
sentence 544(25.6) 1585(74.4) 284(52.2) 260(47.8)
Able to read whole sentence 3314(24.8) 10038(75.2) 2221(42.9) 2957(57.1)
Education No education 912(27.3) 2431(72.7) <0.001 257(58) 186(42) <0.001
Primary 4007(26.5) 11104(73.5) 2371(51.7) 2213(48.3)
Secondary 817(20.7) 3125(79.3) 608(32.3) 1275(67.7)
Higher 52(16.3) 268(83.8) 57(27.9) 147(72.1)
Marriage Never married 2676(59.8) 1801(40.2) <0.001 1542(57.5) 1142(42.5) <0.001
Married 2212(16.6) 11099(83.4) 1407(39.5) 2158(60.5)
Living together 306(16) 1612(84) 239(39.1) 373(60.9)
Widowed 190(22.4) 660(77.6) 14(48.3) 15(51.7)
Divorced 244(20.9) 924(79.1) 53(41.7) 74(58.3)
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not living together 160(16.1) 832(83.9) 38(39.2) 59(60.8)
Wealth Poorest 1248(27.9) 3229(72.1) 0.001 568(50.3) 562(49.7) <0.001
Poorer 1137(25.6) 3305(74.4) 730(50.6) 713(49.4)
Middle 1166(25) 3491(75) 695(47.5) 768(52.5)
Richer 1155(24.9) 3479(75.1) 680(44.4) 851(55.6)
Richest 1082(24) 3424(76) 620(40.1) 927(59.9)
Notes to Table 6: P value was calculated using chi-2 test. No reply was excluded.
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Table 7 presents the mean values and concentration indices for the need and non-
need variables. Genital sore or ulcer is the most commonly reported of the three
indicators of need (6.9% of women and 3.4% of men). Among women, the CI for
need is zero. Among men, the CI is also very small, but negative, indicating that
need is concentrated among the relatively poor. The equitable distribution of need is
surprising given that HIV prevalence is higher among the relatively wealthy in Malawi.
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TABLE 7: DESCRIPTIVE SUMMARY OF NEED AND NON-NEED VARIABLES AND THEIR CONCENTRATION INDICES, DHS 2010
Women (N=22716) Men (N=7114)
Variable N Mean CI S.D P value § N Mean CI S.D P value §
Test Ever tested for HIV 22,716 0.745 0.436 7,114 0.537 0.499
N1 Any std in last 12 months 377 0.016 0.003 0.127 <0.001 113 0.016 -0.034 0.124 0.1341
N2 Genital sore/ulcer in last 12 months 1594 0.069 0.002 0.253 <0.001 245 0.034 -0.045 0.182 0.0062
N3 Genital discharge in last 12 months 860 0.037 0.002 0.189 <0.001 183 0.025 -0.006 0.156 0.9266
wealth Pooled 22,716 3.011 0.264 1.408 0.001 7,114 3.130 0.249 1.381 <0.001
Lowest wealth quintile 4,477 0.197 0.398 1,130 0.159 0.366
Second lowest wealth quintile 4,442 0.196 0.397 1,443 0.203 0.402
Middle wealth quintile 4,657 0.205 0.404 1,463 0.206 0.404
Second upper wealth quintile 4,634 0.204 0.403 1,531 0.215 0.411
Upper wealth quintile 4,506 0.198 0.399 1,547 0.217 0.413
literacy Pooled 22,716 1.269 0.127 0.913 0.014 7,114 1.532 0.075 0.800 <0.001
Cannot read at all 7,235 0.318 0.466 1,392 0.196 0.397
Able to read only parts of sentence 2,129 0.094 0.291 544 0.076 0.266
Able to read whole sentence 13,352 0.588 0.492 5,178 0.728 0.445
educati
on Pooled 22,716 1.055 0.129 0.612 <0.001 7,114 1.260 0.116 0.612 <0.001
No education 3,343 0.147 0.354 443 0.062 0.242
Primary 15,111 0.665 0.472 4,584 0.644 0.479
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Secondary 3,942 0.174 0.379 1,883 0.265 0.441
Higher 320 0.014 0.118 204 0.029 0.167
marriag
e Pooled 22,716 1.291 -0.076 1.228 <0.001 7,114 0.825 -0.044 0.910 <0.001
Never married 4,477 0.197 0.398 2,684 0.377 0.485
Married 13,311 0.586 0.493 3,565 0.501 0.500
Living together 1,918 0.084 0.278 612 0.086 0.280
Widowed 850 0.037 0.190 29 0.004 0.064
Divorced 1,168 0.051 0.221 127 0.018 0.132
not living together 992 0.044 0.204 97 0.014 0.116
Notes: 1) Variables Test, N1, N2 and N3 take the value 1 for “yes” and 0 for “no”.2) CI:
Concentration index 3) S.D : standard deviation 4) § : Calculated using t test for need variables
and chi-2 test for non-need variables.
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Table 8 presents the results of decomposing the CI for HIV test uptake in DHS
2010. It also shows the contributions of the need and non-need variables to the
estimated socio-economic inequity in HIV testing. The sum of the homogeneous
contributions of the need variables from the standard decomposition is approximately
zero for both women and men. The sum of the contributions of corrected need is
also approximately zero for both women and men. This means that non-need
variables explain all of the existing inequity in HIV testing in 2010.
Horizontal inequity among both women and men is positive (0.008 and 0.040
respectively), indicating that for a given need, the relatively wealthy are more likely to
access HIV testing in Malawi. However, the degree of horizontal inequity is small,
especially for women. There is no difference between horizontal inequity and
corrected need adjusted inequity.
Figure 4 illustrates the contributions of the different non-need factors to the
inequity in HIV testing. For both women and men in 2010, education is the most
important non-need contributor to the concentration index. However, in 2004, wealth
was a significant contributor for both women and men.
3.4.2 Comparison of 2010 with 2004
The results from DHS 2010 contrast significantly with the data for 2004 in terms of
access to HIV testing and inequity. Appendix 5 describes HIV testing by socio-
economic status in 2004. Access to HIV testing has dramatically increased in the
intervening period. In 2004, only 14.7% of women and 16.0% of men had been
tested, compared with 74.5% of women and 53.7% of men in 2010. The pattern of
socio-economic differences in 2004 was similar to 2010. However, one difference is
worth noting; in 2004, socio-economic differences tended to be similar in magnitude
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among both women and men, while in 2010, the differences were more pronounced
among men than among women. For example, the gap in testing between illiterate
and fully literate decreased from 6 to 2 percentage points among women but
increased from 7 to 14 percentage points among men. However, the gap in testing
between married and never married women was more pronounced in 2010 than in
2004 (43 vs. 7 percentage points). The difference between the highest and the
second highest wealth quintiles was relatively large in 2004 (8 and 11 percentage
points among women and men respectively) but relatively small in 2010 (1 and 4
percentage points respectively).
The concentration indices for the need variables for women were negative but
close to zero in 2004 (Appendix 6). On the other hand, for men, the CIs for the need
variables were positive. This suggests that in 2004, need for HIV testing among men
was concentrated among the relatively rich, but by 2010 the need for testing was
equitably distributed.
Table 8 shows the decomposition of the CI for HIV testing in 2004. Horizontal
inequity has fallen significantly between 2004 and 2010 from 0.152 to 0.008 for
women, and from 0.185 to 0.04 for men. In 2010, there was no difference between
horizontal inequity and corrected need adjusted inequity in 2004.
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TABLE 8: DECOMPOSITION OF THE CONCENTRATION INDEX FOR HIV TESTING, DHS 2010 AND 2004
DHS 2010 Women Men
Need Coefficient
P
value†
Homogeneo
us
Corrected
need
P
value††
Coefficie
nt
P
value†
Homogeneo
us
Corrected
need
P
value††
N1(had any std in last 12 months) 0.097 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.915 0.022 0.667 0.000 0.000 0.560
N2(had genital sore/ulcer in last 12
months) 0.065 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.900 0.077 0.028 -0.001 0.000 0.225
N3(had genital discharge in last 12
months) 0.037 0.029 0.000 0.000 0.931 -0.001 0.990 0.000 0.000 0.119
Sum of need contribution 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000
Non- need
Wealth 0.009 0.000 0.010 0.002 0.707 0.003
Literacy -0.001 0.723 0.000 0.023 0.007 0.005
Education 0.056 0.000 0.010 0.150 0.000 0.041
Marriage‡ 0.079 0.000 -0.002 0.081 0.000 -0.009
Sum of non-need contribution 0.018 0.040
Horizontal inequity (HI) 0.008 0.008 0.04 0.04
DHS 2004 Women Men
Need Coefficient
P
value†
Homogeneo
us
Corrected
need
P
value††
Coefficie
nt
P
value†
Homogeneo
us
Corrected
need
P
value††
N1(had any std in last 12 months) 0.067 0.074 -0.001 0.000 0.528 0.026 0.718 0.002 0.000 0.065
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N2(had genital sore/ulcer in last 12
months) -0.003 0.831 0.000 0.000 0.166 0.041 0.300 0.002 0.000 0.118
N3(had genital discharge in last 12
months) 0.042 0.052 -0.003 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.992 0.000 -0.001 0.229
Sum of need contribution -0.004 0.000 0.004 -0.001
Non- need
Wealth 0.022 0.000 0.116 0.023 0.000 0.109
Literacy 0.001 0.817 0.001 -0.012 0.213 -0.009
Education 0.049 0.000 0.045 0.101 0.000 0.082
Marriage‡ 0.023 0.000 -0.001 0.027 0.000 -0.012
Sum of non-need contribution 0.161 0.17
Horizontal inequity (HI) 0.152 0.152 0.185 0.186
Notes to Table 8: The contribution of homogeneous need corresponds to the first term in equation (6). Corrected need correspond to the second term in
equation (6). *Horizontal inequity is calculated by subtracting the need contribution from the unstandardized concentration index. P value††: calculated
using t-test comparing corrected need with zero. ‡: calculated using not married (divorced, widowed, never married and not living together) and living
together (married and living together)
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Figure 4 illustrates that in 2004, wealth was the largest contributor to the
concentration index for women and also accounted for a great part of the
contribution to the concentration index for men. This implies that as the extent of
inequity in HIV testing has fallen between 2004 and 2010, the main contributor to
inequity has also changed from wealth to education over this time.
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FIGURE 4: CONTRIBUTION OF NON-NEED FACTORS TO THE INEQUALITY IN HIV TESTING UPTAKE IN MEN AND WOMEN IN MALAWI, DHS 2010
AND DHS 2004
Women
DHS
2010
Men
DHS
2010
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3.4.3 Decomposition analysis: Rural-urban inequality
Rural-urban inequality in HIV testing was also examined. The results show that
there exists little rural-urban inequality in HIV testing in 2010 (Table 9). Horizontal
inequity among women living in rural areas was 0.005 compared with 0.014 among
women living in urban areas, and 0.041 among men living in rural areas compared
with 0.007 among men in urban areas. This means that access to HIV testing is
more pro-rich among men in rural areas. In 2004, however, horizontal inequity
among women and men living in urban areas was higher (0.18 and 0.211,
respectively) than among women and men living in rural areas (0.111 and 0.146
respectively). This result suggests that while access to HIV testing was more
affected by socioeconomic factors in urban areas in 2004, men in rural areas are
somewhat less affected by socioeconomic factors in 2010. Figure 5 illustrates
regional variation in horizontal inequity in 2004 and in 2010.
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TABLE 9: RURAL URBAN INEQUALITY IN HIV TESTING IN MALAWI , DHS 2010 AND 2004
Urban total(2010) Rural total(2010)
Women Men Women Men
CI CI CI CI
Wealth 0.218 Wealth 0.203 Wealth 0.268 Wealth 0.253
Literacy 0.113 Literacy 0.066 Literacy 0.123 Literacy 0.070
Education 0.145 Education 0.124 Education 0.115 Education 0.102
Marriage -0.040 Marriage -0.083 Marriage -0.001 Marriage -0.030
Contribution Contribution Contribution
Need -0.001 Need 0.002 Need 0.000 Need -0.001
Non Need 0.012 Non Need 0.025 Non Need 0.007 Non Need 0.043
HI 0.014 HI 0.007 HI 0.005 HI 0.041
Urban total(2004) Rural total(2004)
Women Men Women Men
CI CI CI CI
Wealth 0.217 Wealth 0.206 Wealth 0.259 Wealth 0.237
Literacy 0.118 Literacy 0.086 Literacy 0.143 Literacy 0.072
Education 0.137 Education 0.111 Education 0.128 Education 0.103
Marriage -0.035 Marriage -0.062 Marriage 0.009 Marriage -0.032
Contribution Contribution
Need -0.002 Need 0.000 Need -0.003 Need 0.009
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Non Need 0.178 Non Need 0.210 Non Need 0.105 Non Need 0.143
HI 0.180 HI 0.211 HI 0.111 HI 0.146
Note to table 9: 1) CI : concentration index
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FIGURE 5: MAP OF HORIZONTAL INEQUITY IN MALAWI
Horizontal inequity of women (2004) Horizontal inequity of women (2010)
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Horizontal inequity of men (2004) Horizontal inequity of men (2010)
Note to Figure 5: Horizontal inequity was calculated based on conventional concentration index.
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3.5 Discussion
This study measures horizontal inequity in access to HIV testing in Malawi, using a
decomposed concentration index. The approach of Van de Poel et al. (86) was
applied to capture differences in need in Malawi. Rural-urban inequity was also
examined using decomposition analysis. Inequity is explored using the 2010 Malawi
DHS data to describe current access to HIV testing. This is compared with inequity
calculated using the 2004 DHS data in order to reflect on possible trends in access
to HIV treatment.
Within the 2010 data, the need for HIV testing was equitably distributed, as
reflected in equality between the standard index of horizontal inequity and corrected,
need-adjusted inequity. In other words, the reference group of high-wealth men and
women did not receive more HIV testing than the whole population. This finding may
seem surprising, given that HIV prevalence is higher for higher SES groups in
Malawi, as in the majority of sub- Saharan African countries (180). As described
earlier however, prevalence estimates are themselves affected by access to testing
in a previous time period. Need in this statement refers to the need for testing, which
does not suffer from the same bias, and the variables we use to estimate this need –
while potentially imperfect - are not subject to those barriers to access that may
affect estimates of HIV prevalence.
Comparing 2010 data with 2004 data, the first notable observation is the total
increase in access to HIV testing in the Malawian context. This increase in testing
has also been accompanied by a significant reduction in horizontal inequities in HIV
testing. These changes may in part be due to the significant financial support for HIV
programmes in Malawi by global donors (8,72). For instance, the Global Fund
disbursed US$ 41 million for implementation of HIV treatment activities, including
HIV testing, in 2005 (181). The number of HIV testing facilities as well as outreach
programmes have increased, and national testing and counselling campaigns have
been conducted (182). In 2008, a national programme offering HIV counselling and
testing to 500,000 pregnant women was implemented at more than 500 sites (82).
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As a result, there has been a shift from facility-based testing to mobile and door-to-
door testing, which appears to have had a net positive impact on testing access, and
also a positive impact on the equity of access to treatment – overcoming previous
non-need barriers to HIV test access (82).
In short, the strategies adopted for expanding access to HIV testing in Malawi
have been successful in reducing inequity and expanding access. That reduction has
taken place in both urban and rural areas. However, some degree of inequity
remains among men living in rural areas, despite substantial investments in mobile
clinics and door-to-door testing. A number of studies have found that distance is one
of the biggest barriers to obtaining access to HIV testing and treatment in sub-
Saharan Africa (183–185) and that transport costs constitute a substantial burden for
patients in Malawi. In general, mobile testing is deemed a useful tool for offering HIV
testing to low SES groups living in rural areas (147).
The reduced inequity observed in this study is of particular interest as global
donors have been criticised for having a short term results focus, with a need to
attributed outcomes to their funding or support (186). Critics are concerned that
programs carried out by global health initiatives may create vertical service delivery
structures that, to some extent, exacerbate health system problems (187). This
seems not to have been the case in the Malawian context over the period from 2004-
2010.
While these findings advance our understanding of inequity in HIV test uptake in
Malawi and comparable contexts, the analysis has known limitations. Trends in the
uptake of HIV testing since 2010 cannot be measured as no more recent data are
available. DHS Malawi 2014 is being prepared but is not currently available at the
moment. When DHS 2014 becomes available, it will be possible to study whether the
equity trends identified in this study have also continued since 2010 and this is
identified as a priority area for future study. Moreover, only three variables on STI
symptoms were available within the DHS datasets. As a result, the need for HIV
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testing may be conservatively estimated in these analyses. The addition of further
need variables in future analyses may enable a more nuanced or sensitive analysis
of inequity in HIV testing in the Malawian context.
3.6 Conclusion
Measuring inequity in HIV test uptake is important to improve access to care and
inform health policy. While global stakeholders in HIV financing and care are
embracing the 90-90-90 agenda, there has been a paucity of evidence on inequity in
HIV test uptake in local sites which could highlight important barriers to care and that
may constitute barriers to the attainment of these goals.
In resource-limited countries, expansion in access does not always result in
improved equity in access. The findings of this study show that access to HIV testing
has significantly expanded in the Malawian context, and socioeconomic inequity in
HIV test access has significantly reduced between 2004 and 2010. This may be
attributed not only to increases in donor funding in this period, but also to the
strategies that donor used to expand testing access to the rural population. It
remains to be seen whether the observed low degree of inequity can be sustained as
global priorities and funding patterns change. Finally, as education persists as the
remaining contributor to horizontal inequity, the question of how to further increase
testing among men and reduce the residual inequity among rural men in particular,
remains a priority area for further study.
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4 Can Voluntary Pooled Procurement
Reduce the Price of Antiretroviral
Drugs? A case study of Efavirenz6
6 This chapter has been accepted in Health policy and planning as of 13th Nov
2016. This chapter reflected the recommendations and this chapter is a revised
version. The decision letter is in Appendix 15.
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4.1 Introduction
Global health initiatives and international non-government organisations (NGOs)
such as the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM), the
President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and the Clinton HIV/AIDS
Initiative (CHAI) have used a number of strategies to procure antiretroviral therapy
(ARV) at lower prices. Common strategies include negotiation (188,189) and a range
of procurement mechanisms (94).
Historically, the funding mechanism of GFATM was based on the country
coordination mechanism (CCM), which was initiated after receiving a grant proposal
from the government. Within this system, medicine procurement was effectively left
to each principal recipient (PR) (71,92,94), and Ripin et al. (45) refer to this as a
‘distributed country-led’ model. Under this arrangement, each country was free to
select its own supply chain and procurement companies, and to set policies to
manage tendering, purchasing and ordering (45). GFATM would then disburse the
funds for the procurement once the country’s proposal was approved. Finally, each
principal recipient (PR) would procure the ARV drugs. Under CCM, the Ministry of
Health or another implementing body may negotiate ‘directly’ with manufacturers or
contract with logistics companies using GFATM funding (71).
There are a number of price reduction strategies available for HIV drugs: pooled
procurement, differential pricing and generic competition;
a) Pooled procurement involves purchasing drugs in bulk for multiple buyers, to
reduce the cost of the drugs and is based on the principles of economies of scale
(94). Multiple buyers are grouped into a single group to obtain the benefits of pooled
procurement.
b) Price differentiation based on the income of consumers, can maximize profits
for manufacturers. In this instance, price differentiation or differential pricing occurs
when low and middle income countries are sold the drugs at lower prices than high
income countries (190).
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c) Generic competition is a strategy where price is reduced by supplying multiple
generic versions of drugs after the patent for the branded equivalent drug has
expired. Perez-Casas (191) showed that the price of a branded drug can be reduced
by generic competition. In Brazil, generic competition lowered the branded price of
Stavudine, Lamivudine and Nevirapine from $10,439 to $631, while the generic price
dropped to $800 from $2,767.
In 2009, GFATM commenced voluntary pooled procurement (VPP), wherein
purchases were pooled at the national level, increasing the negotiating power of
purchasers (93). Under the VPP system, each PR country may volunteer to join the
procurement programme, but are not obligated to do so. Between 2009 and 2011, 47
countries joined the scheme, usually to purchase one or more of five key health
products: ARVs for HIV, artemisinin-based combination therapy (ACTs) for malaria,
long-lasting insecticidal bed nets (LLINs), rapid diagnostic tests (RDTs) for
Tuberculosis (TB), and condoms. Overall, 307 million daily doses of antiretroviral
drugs were procured and approximately 336,000 people received ARV therapy with
drugs purchased through voluntary pooled procurement (97).
The VPP mechanism is mainly implemented by a procurement services agent
(PSA), working on behalf of a principal recipient country.7 Although the GFATM may
facilitate communications between the principal recipient and the procurement
services agents (PSA), the GFATM does not act as an agent (192). The principle
recipient sends a request with product specifications, quantities and delivery dates to
the Procurement Services Support (PSS) team. The PSA invites bids from
manufacturers and submits price quotations to the principle recipient (192). The
principle recipient then decides whether they accept the price quoted. The PSA can
act for multiple principles in a single transaction, thus effectively ‘bulk buying’ for a
number of purchasers. In theory, bulk purchasing of this sort is expected to lead to
price reductions in commodities (92,193).
7 The Global Fund hires local fund agents (LFA) such as Price Waterhouse Coopers (PWC) and
KPMG who monitor and oversee grant performance. Their role is different from PSA (71,246).
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Pooling procurement would be expected to increase procurement efficiency and
reduce transaction costs (93), further reducing the cost of drugs purchased. Pooled
procurement is a form of cooperation between buyers and suppliers using the
purchasing power that buyers have (194). The purpose of pooled procurement is to
provide sustainable supply of commodities, reduce transaction costs and the total
price paid for ARV (195). Therefore, appropriately conducted pooled procurement is
likely to help low income countries access to ARV.
However, there is a paucity of evidence regarding the effect of bulk purchasing
and VPP on procurement prices in practise. Waning et al. (94) tried to estimate the
impact of global strategies such as large volume purchasing and the Clinton Health
Access Initiative’s (CHAI) price negotiation on antiretroviral drug prices, using the
global price purchasing mechanism (GPRM) database. They carried out an analysis
using bulk purchase as a proxy for pooled procurement. They concluded that large
purchase volumes did not necessarily reduce drug prices. While their study found
no beneficial price effect in the case of a single buyer, a study of VPP would enable
the exploration of a potential price effect when bulk purchasing is conducted on
behalf of multiple buyers. Wafula et al. (193) studied procurement prices after the
introduction of VPP, using 115 completed questionnaires from 69 countries. In that
study, two-thirds of those who had used the VPP system replied that VPP made
procurement cheaper, although that reduction was not quantified as this study was
based on the interviews. Wafula et al. (196), in a separate study, also analysed
regional and temporal trends in the costs of malaria-related commodities using
procurement data from 79 countries. They concluded that VPP resulted in significant
declines in the cost of malaria rapid diagnostic tests (RDTs) and long-lasting
insecticide-treated nets (LLINs). The impact of VPP on antiretroviral drugs was,
however, not explored.
In addition to the studies already cited above, other studies have explored drug
prices using procurement data. Danzon et al. (197) examined the effect of income
and competition on drug prices using GPRM data and IMS health8 data for the
8 IMS health is a private company offering information regarding health care.
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period 2004–2008. GPRM data was used to compare procurement prices, while IMS
data was used to compare retail prices. The authors found that the income of a
country was not associated with the drug prices and the availability of generic
competition did not reduce the price of drugs. However, they also found that
procurement based on tendering that stimulates price competition can reduce the
prices of ARVs. Lucchini et al. (198) studied ARV price variation in Africa and Brazil.
They used an econometric analysis with multiple linear regressions for 13 sub
Saharan African countries in their study of price variation, using data from
Medecines Sans Frontiers (MSF). As with Danzon et al. (197), they found no clear
relationship between basic indicators like GDP per capita and the ex-manufacturer
prices for generic and original drugs across countries. Wirtz et al. (199) carried out a
study of price comparison of ARV drugs in order to identify factors related to lower
drug prices. In contrast with Danzon et al. (197) and Lucchini et al. (198), they
concluded that countries defined as ‘lower-middle income’ and ‘upper-middle income’
tended to pay significantly more for ARVs than ‘low-income countries’. They did not
focus on compulsory licensing but demonstrated that differential pricing is not
applied in proportion to the income per capita of country. No study has yet, to our
knowledge, formally explored the impact of VPP on antiretroviral drug prices.
To fill this gap in the evidence, this study aims to estimate the effect of VPP on
the price of antiretroviral drugs, using difference-in-difference (DID) analysis of WHO
GPRM data. The drug Efavirenz is chosen as a case study given the emphasis on
fixed dose combination (FDC) therapy in the WHO HIV treatment guidelines (200).
A significant proportion of patients are currently on Efavirenz. In 2012,
approximately 16% of children were using Efavirenz based first-line regimens in low
and middle income countries (201). One study conducted in Sweden reported that
among 276 HIV patients, 61% (168 patients) were given EFV as part of the initial
regimen (202). In 2008, the number of people using Efavirenz was less than 2
million but expected to rise to more than 9 million by 2016 (201). Given the
expectation that approximately 16.8 million people will be using anti-retroviral
therapy by 2016 (201), and Efavirenz is increasingly being used as part of ARV
administration, demand for the drug is likely to remain high.
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Antiretroviral therapy generally requires a large number of tablets every day.
In contrast, fixed-dose combinations (FDCs) need only once or twice daily doses,
significantly simplifying the process of antiretroviral therapy (203). Fixed-dose
combination therapy tends also to be cheaper than more complex treatment
schedules (204) and is more easily preserved, as it does not need refrigeration. As a
result, FDC therapy is especially useful in resource-limited countries in which cold
storage may be absent or unreliable. Perhaps unsurprisingly, global organisations
are increasing their commitment to FDC (205) and non-nucleoside reverse-
transcriptase inhibitors (NNRTI) such as Efavirenz or Nevirapine, which have a
pivotal role in FDC therapy. Of these drugs, Efavirenz is widely held to have a
smaller risk of virologic failure (206). Considering that the wider uptake of FDC
therapy may, in itself, have lowered ARV prices in the procurement market (92), it
becomes important to adopt a methodology that can isolate any additional price
effects of voluntary pooled procurement.
4.2 Literature review
Literature review was carried out regarding the impact of voluntary pooled
procurement on ARV of GFATM using the keywords: global fund and voluntary
pooled procurement. The search result clearly shows that this topic was
substantially less highlighted. Eight articles contained those terms on the Web of
Science and PubMed. This result was narrowed down to 4 when refined with
voluntary (Appendix 3). Each was chosen for relevance to the research question
(92,193,196,207). Three identical articles by Wafula et al. were identified
(Appendix 4). These were de-duplicated and 4 articles were finally included.
Waning et al. (92) analysed price trends in ARV drugs using several data
sources based on ARV purchase transaction. They found that purchase volumes
for HIV drugs such as emtricitabine and tenofovir substantially increased from
2006 to 2008. Based on the findings, they argued that GFATM VPP will introduce
large-scale purchasers, which will aggregate the number of buyers.
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Wafula et al. (196) analysed for the three most widely procured commodities
such as long-lasting insecticide-treated nets (LLINs), malaria rapid diagnostic tests
(RDTs) and the artemether/lumefantrine (AL) combination treatment. They
concluded that the cost of RDT was lowest in West and Central Africa (US$ 0.57),
and highest in Latin America (US$ 1.1.) For the period between 2005 and 2012,
VPP costs showed significant declines for RDTs.
Wafula et al. (193) analysed GFATM procurement data for 3 commodities: male
condoms, HIV rapid tests, and ARV combination of lamivudine, nevirapine, and
zidovudine. They concluded that pooled procurement lowered costs for condoms
but not for other commodities included in the study.
Wafula et al. (207) carried out an internet-based survey on 315 principal
recipients to identify their perception on the procurement programme of GFATM.
Sixty-nine African countries replied and most PRs thought that the voluntary
pooled procurement by GFATM was effective to simplify the procurement process.
To sum up, the result of literature search reveals that the assessment on the
effort of GFATM to supply HIV drugs received less attention. Although these
studies attempted to estimate or evaluate the effect of VPP, the result is limited, as
they focused merely on time trends in procurement costs using a simple OLS
rather than estimating the policy impact. Therefore, one needs to conduct analysis
using a more elaborated econometric method, such as difference-in-difference
analysis, to precisely estimate the impact of the programme.
4.3 Data
This analysis uses WHO Global Price Report Mechanism (GPRM) data from
2004 to 2013. This is a panel data set of information on transaction prices for
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antiretroviral drugs purchased by international donors and programmes in low- and
middle-income countries. GPRM is an umbrella term for procurement data. It was
developed from an earlier version of the Price and Quality Report (PQR), and the
price data included in the Price and Quality Report is automatically fed into the
GPRM (208). Procurement services agents (PSAs) are responsible for entering
data into the price and quality report (PQR) system, and therefore also into the
GPRM. Grant funded purchases conducted using voluntary pooled procurement, are
similarly reported to the PQR system by the procurement services agents (PSA) and
so need not be entered by principal recipient (PR) countries (209). As the aim of this
study is to estimate the overall impact of VPP on the mean change in a particular
drug’s price in all locations, rather than any country-specific impact on prices, GPRM
data appears to be appropriate for the purpose of this analysis.
GPRM data contain two types of prices: ex-works prices and International
Commercial Terms (incoterms) prices. Ex-works prices refer to the wholesale price
at the manufacturer’s site, while incoterms prices reflect which side, either seller or
buyer, covers payment and risks (210). Incoterms prices are expected to reflect real
procurement prices because the procurement process involves shipping charges
such as freight and transport fees, which are not appropriately reflected in ex-works
prices. Incoterms includes ex-works price and other 10 rules : FCA( Free Carrier) ;
CPT(Carriage Paid To) ; CIP (Carriage And Insurance Paid To) ; DAT (Delivered At
Terminal) ; DAP (Delivered At Place) ; DDP (Delivered Duty Paid) ; FAS (Free
Alongside Ship) ; FOB (Free On Board) ; CFR ( Cost and Freight) ; CIF (Cost,
Insurance and Freight) ; EXW( Ex works) (211).
The main Incoterms rules applied for VPP countries from 2009 to 2013 were:
EXW (Ex works: 68%), CIP (Carriage And Insurance Paid To:14%), and FCA (Free
Carrier: 13%). Those for non VPP countries for the same period were; CIP (Carriage
And Insurance Paid To: 27%), FCA (Free Carrier: 25%), and EXW (Ex works :15%).
This text has also been inserted in the appendices (Appendix 12).
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Information as to whether a country procured ARVs through VPP was obtained
from the Price and Quality Reporting System (PQR) data (Appendix 7). A total of 25
out of 107 countries volunteered for VPP to procure generic Efavirenz between 2009
and 2011 (Appendix 7). GPRM data specify country, dosage, incoterms and ex-
works unit prices, number of units, and manufacturer. Under VPP, Efavirenz was
procured by only one logistics company, the Partnership for Supply Chain
Management (PFSCM) (Appendix 8). This study focuses on 600mg Efavirenz, given
that the 600mg dosage makes up more than 60% of all procured Efavirenz
(appendix 9). A total of 25 out of 107 countries volunteered for VPP to procure
generic Efavirenz between 2009 and 2011 (Appendix 7), however, countries may
procure Efavirenz through VPP or other programmes. To include only Efavirenz
procured by VPP, observed data was dropped if the manufacturers in the GPRM
data and price quality reporting (PQR) data did not match. 121 observations over 10
years were retained for a treatment group of 25 countries, while 482 were from a
control group of 82 countries.
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4.4 Methods
Difference in difference estimation of the impact of voluntary pooled
procurement on drug prices in this study can be expressed using Equation (1)
(101,173).
    =       +        +      Í     +                     +                  +       +       +              +       +                        +            +    
(1)
where,     is a dummy variable equalling 1 for those countries that utilised
VPP and 0 for those not using VPP.      is a set of year dummy variables
representing years with the label/name corresponding to the relevant year, spanning
2004 to 2013 and generated from a reference year of 2004. Since VPP was
implemented in different countries for different periods from 2009, the interaction
term of VPP (Treatment)  Year (Post) is the main variable of interest, and the
coefficient of this term is the effect of VPP on procurement prices (173). Subscripts t
and i refer to year and country, respectively, while     is the error term.
Due to the highly skewed distribution of drug prices, a generalised linear model
(GLM) was employed in the estimations. GLM is an estimation strategy well suited to
modelling skewed data (212). Several other models have been suggested for
skewed data including ordinary least square (OLS) on log transformed data, and a
GLM with a log link and Gamma or Poisson distributions. The first approach using
log transformation has the challenge of necessitating a smearing factor.
Exponentiation of the mean of the logs generates the geometric mean of the skewed
dependent variable (in this case costs), which is a downward-biased estimate of the
arithmetic mean (212). To avoid this problem, a smearing factor, ∅ = 1/
 ∑  (    ̂ )     should be used where    corresponds to the log of cost and  ̂ 
corresponds to the treatment-group-specific mean of the log. However, results using
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this smearing factor can be inconsistent. In contrast, GLM predicts the mean of the
log without using a smearing factor and thus tends to yield more consistent results.
GLM does however, entail assumptions about the underlying distribution
(101,213). The modified park test for the data suggests the choice of the Gamma
distribution for the GLM, presenting the coefficient of 2.037 (P-value= 0.7374).
When the coefficient is approximately 2, Gamma distribution is recommended
whereas Poisson is chosen when the coefficient is 1. In addition, high p-value
presents that Gamma distribution cannot be rejected. As a result, a GLM with a log
link and Gamma distribution was chosen for this study. All analyses were carried out
with Stata, Version 12 (StataCorp, College Station, Texas, USA).
To capture country-level heterogeneity, a fixed-effects model was used in the
analysis. In practice, it is hard to assume that it was only VPP that affected the
procurement prices. The fixed-effects model is a good method to control the
endogeneity owing to a time-invariant omitted variable (101). In other words, the
fixed-effects model is robust to unobserved time-invariant omitted variables. As
commands in STATA (version 12) for GLM do not fully support fixed effects, country
dummies were included as subject-specific intercepts for fixed effects. We
implemented the Hausman test with the null hypothesis that the preferred model is
random effects(RE) vs. the fixed effects(FE): Chi2(16)=61.75 (P value<0.001).
Therefore, the more appropriate model for the data in the study is confirmed as a FE
model.
Considering the literatures for factors associated with prices for HIV drugs
(94,190,191,197–199,214–222) and the panel data of a drug price that will be used
in this study, seven independent variables at country level were included in the
model (Table 10): transaction volume of 600mg Efavirenz, HIV prevalence, tax
revenue as percentage of GDP, gross national income (GNI), consumer price index
(CPI), public health expenditure as % of total health expenditure, and number of
generic manufacturers. Transaction volume is the sum of the product of quantity per
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package and the number of packages, and it is obtained from WHO GPRM. The
number of generic manufacturers presents a generic competition in the market,
which is in line with the study by Danzon et al. (197). Among the studies identifying
the importance of these independent variables in analyses of drug prices, only four
carried out their analyses using procurement data (94,197–199). Consequently, the
association between procurement and these likely independent variables will be
investigated further in this study.
4.4.1 Sample size
This study uses a sample size of 25 treatment countries and 82 control countries.
There is no general guideline on the minimum treatment group size for country level
difference in difference analysis. Jones and Schneider (223) explored the
association between global inequality in income and national average IQ using 23
countries of treatment group and 63 comparisons. Slaughter (224) performed
difference in difference analysis at country level with four countries belonging to the
European Economic Community (EEC) as a treatment group and 54 countries in the
control group, in order to see how trade liberalisation contributes to per capita
income convergence across countries. These examples demonstrate that country
level difference in difference analysis is generally based on unbalanced data.
Considering also the sample size norms established by these studies, the sample
size proposed for this study is likely to be acceptable.
Nevertheless, to compensate for the relatively small number of observations for
VPP attending countries and further bolster the results of this analysis, a simulation
using wild cluster bootstrap was conducted. This simulation technique, based on re-
sampling, is widely used in DID analysis to check the robustness of the result
(225,226). It has been shown that wild cluster bootstrap can work well in providing
conservative p-values even for 3 treated groups and 27 control groups (227). A
further advantage of using the wild cluster bootstrap, is to reduce the risk of over-
rejection by adjusting the size of standard error (228). The key idea of using the wild
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cluster bootstrap is to rely on the fact that model errors of a given cluster are
correlated over time, preserving the observed correlation in errors by drawing errors
on the basis of original errors (228).
4.5 Results
Table 10 presents the descriptive statistics for this study. Means of incoterms
prices and ex-works prices are substantially and significantly different between the
treatment group and the control group (p-value <0.001). Among the covariates, GNI
(p-value=0.0033) and CPI (p-value<0.001) were statistically different between the
treatment group and the control group. These results show the possibility that VPP
has an impact on the reduction of drug prices and that GNI and CPI will be
significantly different between VPP attending countries and others.
In Table 10, the mean incoterms price for pre-intervention and post intervention
for VPP and non VPP countries are 0.56 and 0.65, respectively. These fall to 0.15
and 0.2 after intervention. Therefore, there is a 73% reduction in the price for VPP
countries and a 69% reduction for non-VPP countries. Likewise, for ex-works prices,
VPP have a mean of 0.52 and 0.14 pre- and post- intervention respectively,
amounting to a 73% price reduction. In non-VPP countries, ex-works prices are 0.6
and 0.18 pre- and post- intervention respectively, amounting to a 70% price
reduction. In both cases the price reduction is higher for VPP countries.
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TABLE 10: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: 2004-2013
Pre intervention (N=98) Post intervention (N=107) Pvalue
VPP countries(N=24) Non VPP countries(N=74) VPP countries (N=25)
Non VPP
countries (N=82)
Variable Definition Source Mean S.D Mean S.D Mean S.D Mean S.D
Inconterms price Mean unit cost of 600mgEfavirenz(incoterms applied)
WHO
GPRM(229) 0.56 0.18 0.65 0.29 0.15 0.08 0.20 0.12 <0.001
Ex works price Mean unit cost of 600mgEfavirenz(ex works applied)
WHO
GPRM(229) 0.52 0.17 0.60 0.26 0.14 0.06 0.18 0.10 <0.001
Transaction volume Sum of quantity*package oftransaction per year
WHO
GPRM(229) 1589175 3633073 2258281 6172162 3941418 9965920 6050612 14200000 0.8325
Market
competition
Number of generic
manufacturers
WHO
GPRM(229) 1.94 0.91 2.00 1.08 1.86 0.97 1.71 1.06 0.8931
HIV prevalence Prevalence of HIV, total (% ofpopulation ages 15-49)
World
Bank(230) 2.60 3.51 3.63 6.15 2.42 3.50 2.83 5.30 0.3264
GNI GNI per capita, PPP (currentinternational $)
World
Bank(230) 2357.21 1785.72 5109.83 7098.11 2884.95 2514.82 6256.06 8050.83 0.0033
CPI Consumer price index(reference year=2010)
World
Bank(230) 73.04 12.20 64.89 22.21 90.75 14.90 87.02 29.25 <0.001
Public health
expenditure
Health expenditure, public (%
of total health expenditure)
World
Bank(230) 39.44 14.60 44.93 19.50 42.50 15.20 45.80 21.64 0.6621
Tax Tax revenue (% of GDP) WorldBank(230) 7.89 6.73 10.58 11.78 8.78 7.45 7.69 8.45 0.8653
Treatment X Post Interaction term oftreatment*post period
WHO
GPRM(229)
GFATM
PQR(231)
0 0 0 0 0.85 0.36 0 0
Treatment =1 if joined VPP GFATM 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
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PQR(231)
Year (2004 is the reference category)
2005 =1 if year=2005 0.08 0.27 0.12 0.32 0 0 0 0
2006 =1 if year=2006 0.22 0.42 0.24 0.43 0 0 0 0
2007 =1 if year=2007 0.36 0.48 0.27 0.45 0 0 0 0
2008 =1 if year=2008 0.34 0.48 0.33 0.47 0 0 0 0
2009 =1 if year=2009 0 0 0 0 0.19 0.39 0.21 0.41
2010 =1 if year=2010 0 0 0 0 0.22 0.41 0.20 0.40
2011 =1 if year=2011 0 0 0 0 0.22 0.41 0.20 0.40
2012 =1 if year=2012 0 0 0 0 0.17 0.38 0.20 0.40
2013 =1 if year=2013 0 0 0 0 0.20 0.40 0.19 0.39
* P value was calculated using t-test with the interaction term comparing a treatment group with a
control group
*N=number of countries
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4.5.1 Distribution of drug prices
The histogram of ex-works price and incoterms price presents the skewed
distribution of drug prices (Figure 6). This histogram shows that using GLM would be
appropriate for this study.
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FIGURE 6: HISTOGRAM OF EX WORKS PRICE AND INCOTERMS PRICE
*Mean unit cost(US $) of 600 mg Efavirenz for ex works price and incoterms price.
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4.5.2 The assumption of a common trend
A critical assumption of using a DID estimator is to check whether common time
trends hold (101,232,233). The availability of the DID estimator relies on the
assumption that the underlying ‘trends’ in the outcome variable are similar for both
treated and untreated groups in a pre-treatment period. In other words, the
dependent variable should present a common trend before treatment in both the
treatment and control groups. Although visually checking the trend with a graph is
still recommended (233), Autor (234) developed an econometric method to check a
common trend assumption using lagged and lead variables.
From figure 7, it appears that the common trend assumption holds for both
incoterms prices and ex-works prices. In addition, this graph shows that there was
no external shock, or so-called ‘Ashenfelter’s dip’, before treatment (235). This
assumption was again checked with the Autor (234)’s method. This method
establishes whether the treatment effect exists before and after the treatment using
lag and lead variables. If lead and lag variables are significant, it implies that the
effect of treatment existed before and after the treatment. If that is the case, the
common trend assumption will not hold.
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FIGURE 7: THE ASSUMPTION OF A COMMON TREND - GRAPHICAL APPROACH
Ex works price(Mean unit cost 600mg Efavirenz)
Incoterms price(Mean unit cost of 600mg Efavirenz)
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TABLE 11: THE ASSUMPTION OF A COMMON TREND– REGRESSION APPROACH
GLM
Ex works price Incoterms price
Coefficient(95% CI) P value Coefficient(95% CI) P value
Transaction volume 0 (0 : 0 ) 0.106 0 (0 : 0 ) 0.264
HIV prevalence 0.04 (-0.014 : 0.093 ) 0.145 0.041 (-0.015 : 0.097 ) 0.150
GNI 0 (0 : 0 ) 0.982 0 (0 : 0 ) 0.878
CPI -0.001 (-0.002 : 0.001 ) 0.555 -0.001 (-0.003 : 0.001 ) 0.183
health expenditure -0.003 (-0.006 : 0 ) 0.081 -0.002 (-0.006 : 0.001 ) 0.133
tax revenue 0.003 (-0.001 : 0.007 ) 0.089 0.001 (-0.003 : 0.005 ) 0.629
Generic
competition(Manufacturers) -0.012 (-0.041 : 0.017 ) 0.402 -0.015 (-0.045 : 0.016 ) 0.342
Year:2005 -0.031 (-0.259 : 0.197 ) 0.791 -0.05 (-0.29 : 0.19 ) 0.682
Year:2006 -0.343 (-0.562 : -0.124 ) 0.002 -0.371 (-0.601 : -0.14 ) 0.002
Year:2007 -0.667 (-0.886 : -0.447 ) 0.000 -0.675 (-0.906 : -0.443 ) 0.000
Year:2008 -0.863 (-1.081 : -0.645 ) 0.000 -0.837 (-1.067 : -0.607 ) 0.000
Year:2009 -1.283 (-1.503 : -1.063 ) 0.000 -1.256 (-1.488 : -1.024 ) 0.000
Year:2010 -1.615 (-1.838 : -1.392 ) 0.000 -1.635 (-1.87 : -1.4 ) 0.000
Year:2011 -1.915 (-2.14 : -1.69 ) 0.000 -1.85 (-2.087 : -1.613 ) 0.000
Year:2012 -2.031 (-2.26 : -1.803 ) 0.000 -1.998 (-2.239 : -1.757 ) 0.000
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Year:2013 -2.122 (-2.355 : -1.89 ) 0.000 -2.132 (-2.377 : -1.887 ) 0.000
Lag 2(Treatment X Post) 0.027 (-0.063 : 0.116 ) 0.560 0.033 (-0.061 : 0.127 ) 0.493
Lag 1(Treatment X Post) -0.012 (-0.116 : 0.092 ) 0.818 -0.003 (-0.112 : 0.106 ) 0.954
lead1(Treatment X Post) -0.015 (-0.119 : 0.088 ) 0.770 -0.023 (-0.132 : 0.086 ) 0.684
Lead2 (Treatment X Post) -0.001 (-0.099 : 0.097 ) 0.980 0.033 (-0.071 : 0.136 ) 0.536
Treatment X Post -0.173 (-0.291 : -0.055 ) 0.004 -0.209 (-0.333 : -0.085 ) 0.001
treated -0.405 (-1.251 : 0.441 ) 0.348 -0.365 (-1.255 : 0.525 ) 0.422
* Treatment X Post is the term of interaction showing difference-in-difference.
* Lag 1 and lag 2 are the coefficients of lagged variable of interaction term ‘Treatment X Post’, while lead1 and lead2 are the coefficients of the lead variable of
interaction term ‘Treatment X Post’.
*95% CI in parentheses
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Table 11 shows the result of testing for the assumption of a common trend
based on Autor’s method. Other things being constant, GLM regression including lag
and lead variables was carried out. Country effects estimated from this regression
using leads and lags for the common trend can be seen in Appendix 10. Lag 1 and
lag 2 are the coefficients of the lagged variable of interaction term ‘Treatment X Post’,
while lead1 and lead2 are the coefficients of the lead variable of interaction term
‘Treatment X Post’. The p-value of the lead variables in the table 11 is statistically
insignificant, showing that the effect of VPP before treatment is close to zero. If the
trends between treatment and control group are sufficiently similar, then lead2 and
lead1 will be insignificant. In other words, DID is not significantly different between
treatment and control group in the pre-treatment period. Synthetic control method,
which synthesises hypothetical counterfactuals with the weighted average of other
control groups, was not used because the common trend holds (236). In sum, this
result implies that the effect was not happening in the pre-post period, and so it can
be concluded that the common trend assumption holds.
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4.5.3 Difference-in-difference analysis
Table 12 presents the result of difference-in-difference analysis on VPP. The
regression result of GLM shows that the ‘Treatment X Post’ term was statistically
significant at the 0.1% level for each price. Country dummies were used for fixed
effects as aforementioned in the method section and the result is included in
appendix 11 due to the large volume. The results of both ex-works prices and
incoterms prices in GLM were -0.177 (95% confidence interval: -0.247 to -0.107; p-
value<0.001) and -0.213 (95% confidence interval : -0.287 to -0.139; p-value<0.001),
respectively. This suggests that VPP has an effect of reducing the ex-works prices of
generic Efavirenz by 16.2% and incoterms prices by 19.1%, respectively, after taking
the exponential of the interaction term. It is also noted that year dummies were also
statistically significant from 2006 to 2013. On the other hand, it can be seen that the
magnitude of year dummies is gradually increasing. In 2006, ex-works prices
decreased by approximately 29.3% and incoterms prices by 31.8% after taking the
exponential of the year 2006 dummy. However, in 2013, the results of GLM
regression show that ex-works prices decreased by approximately 88.0% and
incoterms prices by 88.3%, compared with when the year is not 2013, after taking
the exponential of the year 2013 dummy. Other independent variables were
statistically insignificant in GLM.
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TABLE 12: DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE ANALYSIS- REGRESSION APPROACH
GLM GLM
Ex works price Pvalue Incoterms price
p
value
Transaction_volume 0 (0 : 0) 0.147 0 (0 : 0) 0.352
HIV prevalence 0.037 (0.004 : 0.07) 0.029 0.035 (-0.001 : 0.071) 0.055
GNI 0 (0 : 0) 0.965 0 (0 : 0) 0.761
CPI 0 (-0.002 : 0.001) 0.4 -0.001 (-0.002 : 0) 0.063
health expenditure -0.003 (-0.005 : 0) 0.016 -0.002 (-0.004 : 0) 0.017
tax revenue 0.004 (0 : 0.007) 0.054 0.001 (-0.002 : 0.004) 0.543
Generic
competition(Manufacturers) -0.012 (-0.037 : 0.012) 0.324 -0.015 (-0.043 : 0.012) 0.276
Year:2005 -0.032 (-0.183 : 0.118) 0.673 -0.057 (-0.228 : 0.115) 0.517
Year:2006 -0.347 (-0.497 : -0.197) 0.000 -0.383 (-0.551 : -0.215) 0.000
Year:2007 -0.673 (-0.821 : -0.525) 0.000 -0.688 (-0.854 : -0.522) 0.000
Year:2008 -0.871 (-1.025 : -0.718) 0.000 -0.851 (-1.019 : -0.683) 0.000
Year:2009 -1.294 (-1.445 : -1.143) 0.000 -1.273 (-1.438 : -1.108) 0.000
Year:2010 -1.635 (-1.796 : -1.475) 0.000 -1.664 (-1.842 : -1.485) 0.000
Year:2011 -1.928 (-2.098 : -1.758) 0.000 -1.87 (-2.054 : -1.686) 0.000
Year:2012 -2.031 (-2.213 : -1.849) 0.000 -2.007 (-2.2 : -1.815) 0.000
Year:2013 -2.125 (-2.296 : -1.954) 0.000 -2.148 (-2.333 : -1.964) 0.000
Treatment X Post -0.177 (-0.247 : -0.107) 0.000 -0.213 (-0.287 : -0.139) 0.000
treated -0.511 (-1.168 : 0.147) 0.128 -0.598 (-1.43 : 0.233) 0.159
DID effect (mean(SD)) † -0.162 -0.191
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Note: 1) Treatment X Post is an interaction term showing the effect of difference-in-difference.
2) 95% CI in parentheses
† :This was calculated by taking the exponential of Treatment X Post and compare it with when Treatment X Post=0
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Table 13 presents the result of bootstrap simulation on the impact of VPP with
the standard DID model described in equation 1. An identical interaction term of
Treatment X Post in table 12 was used. On the basis of 1,000 times bootstrap re-
sampling, this result shows that the coefficient of interaction term of ‘Treatment X
Post’ was consistently negative, -0.174 (95% confidence interval: -0.272 to -0.063, p-
value<0.001) for ex-works price and -0.217 (95% confidence interval: -0.320 to -
0.117, p-value<0.001) for incoterms price, respectively. Based on this result, VPP
reduced the mean unit cost of Efavirenz by approximately 16 % for ex-works price
and by approximately 19 % for incoterms price. Bias was as small as 0.0048 for ex-
works price and 0.0055 for incoterms price, presenting no substantial difference from
the result of GLM model in table 12. Wild cluster bootstrap was conducted separately
with the identical model in equation 1, and the result is incorporated in table 13. The
P-values based on the wild cluster bootstrap for both ex-works price and incoterms
price in table 13 are increased compared with p-values estimated using cluster
robust standard error in table 12 (ex-works price: p<0.001; incoterms price: p<0.001).
However, the p-values were 0.028 and 0.01, which are still statistically significant at
5 % level. In brief, this result of simulation supports the result of the difference-in-
difference analysis and the impact of VPP.
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TABLE 13: BOOTSTRAP SIMULATION ON INTERACTION TERM
Variable Replication Difference-in-difference Bias
95% confidence interval P
value(Cluster)†
P value(wild
cluster
bootstrap)††
TreatmentXPost 1000 Ex works price -0.174 0.0048 -0.272 : -0.063 <0.001 0.0280
TreatmentXPost 1000 Incoterms price -0.217 0.0055 -0.320 : -0.117 <0.001 0.0100
*Replication : 1000 times.
†P value was calculated with cluster robust error.
††P value was calculated with wild cluster bootstrap error.
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4.6 Discussion
This study examined the effect of VPP on the procurement prices of ARV.
Efavirenz was chosen as a case study given the frequent use of Efavirenz in fixed
dose combination (FDC) therapy for HIV. A difference-in-difference (DID) estimator
in regression form was used to estimate the effect of VPP. The assumption of a
common trend was confirmed with graphs and a regression model using lags and
leads of the interaction term. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study
estimating the impact of VPP on ARV procurement prices adopting a formal
econometric method.
The analyses found VPP significantly reduced the procurement price of 600mg
generic Efavirenz. The coefficient of the DID estimator was significant at the 0.1%
level for both ex-works prices and incoterms prices. Simulation using 1,000 times
bootstrap re-sampling and p-values calculated by a wild cluster bootstrap strongly
supported the results of the DID analysis.
A strong decreasing trend in the ARV price over 8 years was also found. Year
dummies were significant for all years aside from 2005. The finding of decreasing
ARV costs over 8 years is consistent with the results of Wafula et al.(196) and with
the trend of consistently decreasing ARV prices more widely observed. The median
procurement price per treatment year for adult first-line regimens in low- and middle-
income countries decreased from $US 499 to $122 between 2003 and 2013
(237,238). In 2006, UNITAID was launched to supply drugs at lower prices (239).
Also in 2006, Generic FDCs were available to PEPFAR recipients after FDA
approval (92). Donor funding for HIV increased from $1.6 billion to $8.7 billion largely
due to PEPFAR and GFATM from 2002 to 2008 (240). The GAVI alliance (GAVI)
committed US $500 million for a 5-year period from 2006 to 2010 (241). Therefore,
the decreasing trend in ARV prices may be associated with increased funding for
ARV procurement, the emergence of powerful global donors, and the introduction of
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generic drugs. These analyses demonstrate that the use of VPP can further reduce
drug prices.
In addition, it was found that HIV prevalence was not associated with drug prices.
This is consistent with Danzon et al. (197) and Wirtz et al. (199). Transaction volume
was not associated with the drug price. This too is consistent with results from Wirtz
et al. (199). They found that transaction volume does not have an effect on the price
reduction using GPRM data. This fact confirms that GPRM data do not support our
common assumption that large procurement volume reduce procurement prices.
Generic competition was not statistically significant and again, this is consistent with
results from Danzon et al. (197) and is plausible because there is little incentive to
reduce ARV prices in generic markets.
While VPP may improve access to HIV drugs, it is difficult to say whether or not
improved procurement arrangements have the ability to strengthen the health
systems of low and middle income countries more generally. It has been pointed out
that the long term dependence of principal recipients (PR) countries on external
funding bodies can weaken the health systems of these countries (242). On the
contrary, PR countries could turn this challenge into an opportunity if they use the
experience to develop the capacity to forecast, budget and plan independently.
Mills (243) argued that the strengthening of public systems of supply such as
transport infrastructure could be an alternate solution for improving drug supply. In
particular, a landlocked country may need additional time for transportation from the
nearest port (192). This argument suggests that improving drug procurement
processes may be an important starting point but would not be sufficient to improve
drug access without a concurrent expansion of public facilities and qualified health
to ensure those drugs reach the patients most in need (243). Thus while VPP may
not strengthen health systems more broadly, health systems strengthening seems a
necessary precursor to maximising the gains of a VPP scheme.
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The quality of the data used in the study has been continuously improved
through the use of rigorous data management and updating with new information.
This includes; Individual transactions in GPRM showing a price of US$0 and
duplications being removed (244), missing data being replaced with updated price
data compared to the previous version of the dataset a few years ago, the recent
inclusion of Incoterms prices in the dataset (244), and the fact that GFATM
periodically report the transaction prices so that the data is constantly updated.
Moreover, as procurement services agents (PSA) rather than recipient countries
have the responsibility for data entry (209) , data is transparently managed.
However, these data do not have components of retail prices such as mark-up.
Therefore, analysis of retail drug prices would not be possible with this dataset.
The strengths of this study are, firstly, that it used the International Chamber of
Commerce standard trade definition (Incoterms) price as a dependent variable. The
majority of studies on procurement prices could not consider the incoterms prices
due to data unavailability. However, excluding incoterms can strongly bias the results
regarding procurement prices because procurement processes include the variable
cost of freight and shipping. This study attempted to reduce this bias by employing
incoterms price as the dependent variable. Secondly, this study is based on the
recently updated GPRM data. The update made this data richer compared with the
previous version of GPRM data; hence, the analysis carried out in this study did not
have to rely on multiple imputation (MI) to supplement missing data. Thirdly,
adopting fixed effects to GLM by including country dummies, which work as subject-
specific slopes, this study tried to control endogeneity arising from time-invariant
unobservables such as national policies. Instrumental variables were not used in this
study as it was hard to find an appropriate instrument for the procurement price of
ARVs, especially the price of incoterms, given the scarcity of literature on the
procurement prices of ARVs. However, this study attempted to reduce the
endogeneity caused by omitted variables (101) by including a proxy variable of
generic competition such as the number of manufacturers and by using a fixed-
effects model.
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A few limitations of these analyses should be noted. Firstly, this analysis
targeted only one ARV, Efavirenz. Therefore, the given result needs to be carefully
interpreted and may not be generalizable to other types of drugs. Further research
expanding the result of this study to other ARVs will be needed. Secondly, the
timeline of analysis was limited to 2013 due to data unavailability, even though VPP
is still being implemented.
4.7 Conclusion
This study provides robust economic evidence about the effect of voluntary pooled
procurement on antiretroviral drug prices and highlights a clear agenda for further
work in this area. Voluntary pooled procurement significantly reduced the price of
600mg generic Efavirenz between 2009 and 2013. Voluntary pooled procurement
can be a potentially effective strategy for the reduction in HIV drug prices and the
improvement of technical efficiency in HIV drug procurement. The findings of this
case study suggest that further work in this area is needed. Future work should aim
to explore a more generalizable or multi-context analysis of the impact of voluntary
pooled procurement. It would also be possible and potentially worthwhile, to carry
out a difference-in-difference analysis on a basket of various HIV drugs rather than
focusing on a single drug such as Efavirenz as in this study.
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5 Conclusion
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The main purpose of this thesis is to assess whether the activities of global donors
for HIV programmes improved technical, productive and allocative efficiency, using
the relevant empirical studies. The topics dealt with in this thesis—harm reduction
intervention, HIV testing, and ARV procurement—are all main activities being
conducted by global health initiatives all over the world. What they have in common
is to target socially deprived people or low-income countries; that is, the main target
of these activities is a vulnerable group less likely to have access to health services
related to HIV. For the purpose mentioned above, a literature review was conducted,
revealing an evidence gap regarding the activities of global donors. Then an
empirical analysis was performed in each chapter with respect to the gap found from
the literature reviews. This analysis not only evaluated the results of interventions
conducted by global donors such as cost-effectiveness and equity of global donors’
intervention but also provide implications for policy on the procurement process of
HIV drugs conducted by the global donors.
The main contributions of this thesis are that the analyses attempted to assess the
activities of global donors, which have received less attention, to enhance the
population health of people living with HIV worldwide. It estimated the cost-
effectiveness of combined NSPs and OST using the example of Ukraine. And equity
analysis was conducted using the HIV testing service in Malawi. It was also
attempted to evaluate the effect of voluntary pooled procurement on HIV drug of
Efavirenz. To the best of our knowledge, all of these case studies were first attempt
to analysis on the issues.
The main findings of this thesis could be summarised as follows. First, in Chapter
2, the analysis found that all interventions were cost-effective in terms of QALYs
gained and HIV infections averted. NSPs alone were the most cost-effective and
OST alone was the least cost-effective option. Either single therapy—NSPs alone or
OST alone—and the combined intervention were all cost-effective in Ukraine.
However, the combined intervention gained more effectiveness at more cost. While it
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did not have the lowest cost-effectiveness ratio, it was significantly more effective
than any alternative. Second, from Chapter 3, comparing DHS 2004 data with DHS
2010 shows how equity and HIV uptake in Malawi depending on socioeconomic
status has varied. It was notable that horizontal inequity dropped between 2004 and
2010 although pro-rich horizontal inequity exists in receiving HIV test in Malawi. The
portion of the population that has ever been tested for HIV increased from 15%
among women and 16% among men in 2004 to 75% among women and 54%
among men in 2010. Horizontal inequity (HI) was 0.152 among women and 0.186
among men in 2004, which indicates that testing was concentrated among the
relatively wealthy. In 2010, there is only a marginal degree of inequity in HIV testing
among women (HI 0.008) and although testing remains pro-rich among men (HI
0.040), the degree of inequity is much smaller than in 2004. HIV test uptake is
associated with socioeconomic factors such as wealth, education, and literacy, and a
main contributor to the horizontal inequity in 2010 was education rather than wealth.
Third, Chapter 4 found that voluntary pooled procurement effectively reduced the
procurement price of 600 mg generic Efavirenz. Voluntary pooled procurement
reduced both the ex-works price of generic Efavirenz and the incoterms price by 16.2%
and 19.1%, respectively. The coefficient of DID estimator was significant at 0.1%
level for ex-works prices and incoterms prices. Simulation using 1,000 times
bootstrap re-sampling and a wild cluster bootstrap strongly supported the results of
DID analysis.
Considering the research questions raised in the introduction of this thesis, some
recommendations for global donors are possible based on the results of each
analytical chapter.
It could be recommended from the findings in Chapter 2 that medical interventions,
such as harm reduction interventions, should consider the affordability of treatment
in the recipient country in accordance with GDP per capita and an appropriate level
of cost-effectiveness threshold. The combined intervention of NSPs and OST was
found to be cost-effective given the GDP per capita of Ukraine. However, it is
doubtful whether this intervention is still deemed cost-effective if conducted in sub-
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Saharan countries, which usually have much lower GDP per capita than Ukraine.
Given the result, combined intervention of harm reduction may be too expensive to
be accepted for the low income countries unless adjustment on cost-effectiveness
threshold and affordability is done.
This is important because it is highly likely that a recipient country will ask GFATM
for funding based on the result of CEA. Likewise, GFATM may refer to the result of
CEA when it disburses funding for recipient countries. In line with the recent trend of
adjustment on a cost-effectiveness threshold, global donors need to think about
whether current level of threshold limits the best level of HIV treatment and whether
cost-effectiveness threshold based on GDP per capita is an appropriate standard to
make a decision on their clinical intervention and antiretroviral therapy.
In Chapter 3, it could be concluded that global donors’ support of HIV testing may
reduce the level of inequity in HIV test uptake. The strategy of global donors shifting
from facility-based HIV testing to mobile and door-to-door testing appears successful.
The important thing is that it served two ends: access and equity.
Based on this finding, we suggest that global health initiatives to pay more
attention on education sector in Malawi. In DHS 2010, education was the main
contributor to the horizontal inequity rather than financial status of people. To
improve the uptake of HIV testing for less educated people would decrease inequity.
Based on the finding in Chapter 4, we recommend a current procurement strategy
such as VPP for more countries to join the programme. If it is not feasible to increase
the affordability of HIV patients or low income countries in a short period of time, to
supply HIV drugs with lower costs using VPP can be an appropriate and an effective
alternative to enhance HIV treatment uptake.
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The analyses in this thesis have several limitations. First, the cost-effectiveness
analysis in Chapter 2 in this thesis relies on secondary data rather than trial based
data. Therefore, it makes more assumptions regarding study setting such as
intervention periods or drop-out rate. Probabilistic sensitivity analysis handled any
uncertainties generated from these assumptions. Second, Chapter 3 did not reflect
geographical development such as modernisation and improved transportation.
Although region CI analysis observes geographical variation, this analysis may not
sufficiently reflect recent trends of HIV testing in Malawi. Third, Chapter 4 targeted
only one ARV, Efavirenz. Therefore, the given result needs to be carefully
interpreted and is not generalisable to other types of drugs. Further research
expanding the analysis of this study to other ARVs will be needed.
There are a few interesting issues to develop our analyses further. With respect to
the cost-effectiveness analysis of harm reduction intervention, it would be interesting
to carry out a study using a clinical data, considering a new cost-effectiveness
threshold rather than WHO CHOICE threshold (Chapter 2). With respect to HIV test
in Malawi, as education has become the main contributor to horizontal inequity, the
questions of how to further increase testing among men and how to reduce the
remaining inequity among rural men in particular remains for further study (Chapter
3). The difference in testing between women and men is massive, so inequity around
gender needs to be highlighted. Lastly, with regards to voluntary pooled procurement,
to obtain a generalisable result, it would be possible to perform a difference-in-
difference analysis on a basket of various HIV drugs rather than focusing on a single
drug and then the coefficients of each DID analysis can be aggregated with a meta-
regression or a hierarchical model (Chapter 4).
The findings of empirical studies in this thesis confirm that the efforts of global
donors successfully improved the efficiency of HIV programmes in terms of global
health. It is highly likely that their activities are not only improving productive and
technical efficiency but also promoting allocative efficiency. VPP can be maintained
for the near future, lowering procurement prices of drugs. Based on these
assessments, this thesis urges that global donors continuously support people living
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with HIV in low-income countries and disadvantaged groups. Most people living with
HIV still heavily rely on the support of global donors.
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Appendix 2-1: Search result on the location of HIV testing facilities in
Malawi(Web of Science)
# 7 27 #6 OR #3
Timespan=All years
Search language=Auto
Select to combine sets.
Select to delete
this set.
# 6 11 TOPIC: (HIV testing)
Refined by:TOPIC: (location)
AND TOPIC: (malawi)
Timespan=All years
Search language=Auto
Select to
combine sets.
Select to delete
this set.
# 5 875 TOPIC: (HIV testing)
Refined by:TOPIC: (location)
Timespan=All years
Search language=Auto
Select to
combine sets.
Select to delete
this set.
# 4 Approximat
ely
162,160
TOPIC: (HIV testing)
Timespan=All years
Search language=Auto
Select to
combine sets.
Select to delete
this set.
# 3 17 TOPIC: (HIV testing facilities)
Refined by:TOPIC: (malawi)
AND TOPIC: (policy)
Timespan=All years
Search language=Auto
Select to
combine sets.
Select to delete
this set.
# 2 93 TOPIC: (HIV testing facilities)
Refined by:TOPIC: (malawi)
Timespan=All years
Search language=Auto
Select to
combine sets.
Select to delete
this set.
# 1 2,484 TOPIC: (HIV testing facilities)
Timespan=All years
Search language=Auto
Select to
combine sets.
Select to delete
this set.

24 articles (excluding duplicates) identified using the strategy of Web of Science.
Author Year Title
Meehan et al. 2015 Availability and acceptability of HIV counselling and testing services. A qualitative study comparing clients' experiences of
accessing HIV testing at public sector primary health care facilities or non-governmental mobile services in Cape Town, South Africa
Bott et al. 2015 Rewards and challenges of providing HIV testing and counselling services: health worker perspectives from Burkina Faso, Kenya
and Uganda
Makusha et al. 2015 HIV Self-Testing Could "Revolutionize Testing in South Africa, but It Has Got to Be Done Properly": Perceptions of Key Stakeholders
Van Rooyen et
al.
2015 What are the constraints and opportunities for HIVST scale-up in Africa? Evidence from Kenya, Malawi and South Africa
Van Lettow et
al.
2014 Towards elimination of mother-to-child transmission of HIV: performance of different models of care for initiating lifelong
antiretroviral therapy for pregnant women in Malawi (Option B plus )
Price et al. 2014 Uptake of prevention of mother-to-child-transmission using Option B plus in northern rural Malawi: a retrospective cohort study
Denno et al. 2012 Reaching Youth With Out-of-Facility HIV and Reproductive Health Services: A Systematic Review
Deo et al. 2012 Modeling the Impact of Integrating HIV and Outpatient Health Services on Patient Waiting Times in an Urban Health Clinic in
Zambia
Van den Akker
et al.
2012 HIV care need not hamper maternity care: a descriptive analysis of integration of services in rural Malawi
Hardon et al. 2012 Women's views on consent, counseling and confidentiality in PMTCT: a mixed-methods study in four African countries
Sartorius et al. 2010 Young and vulnerable: Spatial-temporal trends and risk factors for infant mortality in rural South Africa
(Agincourt), 1992-2007
Israels et al. 2010 Strategies to improve care for children with cancer in Sub-Saharan Africa
Kasenga 2010 Making it happen: prevention of mother to child transmission of HIV in rural Malawi
Hardon et al. 2009 Preventing mother-to-child transmission of HIV in Vietnam and Indonesia: Diverging care dynamics
Bisika 2009 Sexual and reproductive health and HIV/AIDS risk perception in the Malawi tourism industry
Day et al. 2014 CryptoDex: A randomised, double-blind, placebo-controlled phase III trial of adjunctive dexamethasone in HIV-infected adults
with cryptococcal meningitis: study protocol for a randomised control trial
Bedell et al. 2014 Women's choices regarding HIV testing, disclosure and partner involvement in infant feeding and care in a rural district of
Malawi with high HIV prevalence
Phiri et al. 2014 Etiology of Genital Ulcer Disease and Association With HIV Infection in Malawi
Park et al. 2011 Designing a genome-based HIV incidence assay with high sensitivity and specificity
Thorsen et al. 2008 Potential initiators of HIV-related stigmatization: Ethical and programmatic challenges for PMTCT programs
terKuile et al. 2007 Effect of sulfadoxine-pyrimethamine resistance on the efficacy of intermittent preventive therapy for malaria control during
pregnancy - A systematic review
Wyss et al. 2007 Reaching disenfranchised youth and mobile populations in Ghana through voluntary counselling testing services for HIV
deGraft-
Johnson et al.
2005 HIV voluntary counseling and testing service preferences in a rural Malawi population
Misiri et al. 2004 Attitudes towards premarital testing on human immunodeficiency virus infection among Malawians

APPENDIX 3:SEARCH RESULT ON VOLUNTARY POOLED PROCUREMENT BY GFATM (WEB
OF SCIENCE)
# 3 4 TOPIC: (global fund)
Refined by:TOPIC: (pooled
procurement) AND TOPIC: (voluntary)
Indexes=SCI-EXPANDED, SSCI,
A&HCI, CPCI-S, CPCI-SSH, ESCI
Timespan=All years
Select to combine sets. Select to
delete this
set.
# 2 8 TOPIC: (global fund)
Refined by:TOPIC: (pooled
procurement)
Indexes=SCI-EXPANDED, SSCI,
A&HCI, CPCI-S, CPCI-SSH
Timespan=All years
Select to
combine sets.
Select to delete
this set.
# 1 6,042 TOPIC: (global fund)
Indexes=SCI-EXPANDED, SSCI,
A&HCI, CPCI-S, CPCI-SSH
Timespan=All years
8 articles identified usingthestrategy of Web of Science.
Author Year Title
Wafula et al. 2014
Trends in Procurement Costs for HIV Commodities: A 7-Year Retrospective Analysis of Global Fund Data Across 125
Countries
Wafula et al. 2014 Implementing Global Fund programs: a survey of opinions and experiences of the Principal Recipients across 69 countries
Wafula et al. 2013 Regional and temporal trends in malaria commodity costs: an analysis of Global Fund data for 79 countries
Glassman et al. 2013 Global Health and the New Bottom Billion: What do Shifts in Global Poverty and Disease Burden Mean for Donor Agencies?
Shretta et al. 2012 Stabilizing supply of artemisinin and artemisinin-based combination therapy in an era of wide-spread scale-up
Rudge et al. 2010 Critical interactions between Global Fund-supported programmes and health systems: a case study in Papua New Guinea
Waning et al. 2009 Global strategies to reduce the price of antiretroviral medicines: evidence from transactional databases
Price et al. 1999 How the World Trade Organisation is shaping domestic policies in health care
APPENDIX 4: THE RESULT OF LITERATURE REVIEW USING PUBMED (KEYWORD: GLOBAL FUND, VOLUNTARY POOLED PROCUREMENT)
Sent on: Mon Oct 5 19:22:34 2015
Search: (global fund) AND voluntary pooled procurement
PubMed Results
Items 1 - 3 of 3 (Display the 3 citations in PubMed)
1. Implementing Global Fund programs: a survey of opinions and experiences of the Principal Recipients across
69 countries.
Wafula F, Marwa C, McCoy D.
Global Health. 2014 Mar 24;10:15. doi: 10.1186/1744-8603-10-15.
PMID: 24661793 [PubMed - indexed for MEDLINE] Free PMC Article
Similar articles
2. Regional and temporal trends in malaria commodity costs: an analysis of Global Fund data for 79 countries.
Wafula F, Agweyu A, Macintyre K.
Malar J. 2013 Dec 30;12:466. doi: 10.1186/1475-2875-12-466.
PMID: 24373527 [PubMed - indexed for MEDLINE] Free PMC Article
Similar articles
3. Trends in procurement costs for HIV commodities: a 7-year retrospective analysis of global fund data across 125
countries.
Wafula F, Agweyu A, Macintyre K.
J Acquir Immune DeficSyndr. 2014 Apr 1;65(4):e134-9. doi: 10.1097/QAI.0000000000000053.
PMID: 24189152 [PubMed - indexed for MEDLINE]
Similar articles
APPENDIX 5: HIV TESTING BY SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS (DHS 2004)
Women Men
Not Tested
(N=9692)
(% not tested)
Tested
(N=1670)
(% tested)
P
value
Not Tested
(N=2696)
(% not tested)
Tested
(N=513)
(% tested)
P
value
Region Northern 1308(83) 268(17) <0.001 352(78) 99(22) 0.001
Central 3604(89.3) 431(10.7) 1056(85.2) 183(14.8)
Southern 4780(83.1) 971(16.9) 1288(84.8) 231(15.2)
Literacy Cannot read at all 3848(88.7) 492(11.3) <0.001 604(89.5) 71(10.5) <0.001
Able to read only parts of
sentence 833(85.9) 137(14.1) 157(86.3) 25(13.7)
Able to read whole sentence 5011(82.8) 1041(17.2) 1935(82.3) 417(17.7)
Education No education 2325(89) 288(11) <0.001 323(91) 32(9) <0.001
Primary 6121(86.4) 960(13.6) 1793(87.7) 251(12.3)
Secondary 1205(75.3) 395(24.7) 554(73.7) 198(26.3)
Higher 41(60.3) 27(39.7) 26(44.8) 32(55.2)
Marriage Never married 1679(91.1) 165(8.9) <0.001 882(87.1) 131(12.9) 0.057
Married 6438(84.4) 1188(15.6) 1700(82.6) 358(17.4)
Living together 447(82.9) 92(17.1) 29(82.9) 6(17.1)
Widowed 348(85.7) 58(14.3) 13(86.7) 2(13.3)
Divorced 487(84.3) 91(15.7) 36(80) 9(20)
not living together 293(79.4) 76(20.6) 36(83.7) 7(16.3)
Wealth Poorest 1773(89.4) 211(10.6) <0.001 363(87.9) 50(12.1) <0.001
Poorer 1984(87.9) 273(12.1) 602(90.7) 62(9.3)
Middle 2145(87.6) 305(12.4) 632(85.9) 104(14.1)
Richer 2032(85.2) 353(14.8) 614(84.1) 116(15.9)
Richest 1758(76.9) 528(23.1) 485(72.8) 181(27.2)
NOTES : P VALUE WAS CALCULATED USING CHI-2 TEST. NO REPLY WAS EXCLUDED.
APPENDIX 6: DESCRIPTIVE SUMMARY OF NEED, NON-NEED VARIABLES AND THEIR CONCENTRATION INDICES, DHS 2004
Women (N=11362) Men (N=3209)
Variable N Mean CI S.D P value § N Mean CI S.D P value §
Test Ever tested for HIV 11362 0.147 0.354 3,209 0.16 0.367
N1 Any std in last 12 months 106 0.009 -0.036 0.094 0.0058 25 0.008 0.217 0.088 0.2725
N2 Genital sore/ulcer in last 12 months 614 0.052 -0.033 0.223 0.3599 99 0.03 0.08 0.17 0.1884
N3 Genital discharge in last 12 months 346 0.029 -0.099 0.168 0.0168 64 0.019 0.093 0.137 0.7034
wealth Pooled 11362 0.255 <0.001 3,209 0.13 0.235 0.336 <0.001
Lowest wealth quintile 1,984 0.177 0.381 413 0.13 0.336
Second lowest wealth quintile 2,257 0.2 0.4 664 0.207 0.405
Middle wealth quintile 2,450 0.215 0.411 736 0.229 0.42
Second upper wealth quintile 2,385 0.209 0.406 730 0.227 0.419
Upper wealth quintile 2,286 0.199 0.4 666 0.207 0.405
literacy Pooled 11362 1.142 0.151 0.946 <0.001 3,209 1.519 0.079 0.821 <0.001
Cannot read at all 4,340 0.387 0.487 675 0.212 0.409
Able to read only parts of sentence 970 0.085 0.279 182 0.057 0.232
Able to read whole sentence 6,052 0.528 0.499 2,352 0.731 0.444
education Pooled 11362 0.918 0.148 0.624 <0.001 3,209 1.158 0.113 0.625 <0.001
No education 2,613 0.233 0.423 355 0.111 0.314
Primary 7,081 0.622 0.485 2,044 0.638 0.481
Secondary 1,600 0.139 0.346 752 0.233 0.423
Higher 68 0.006 0.077 58 0.018 0.133
marriage Pooled 11362 1.238 -0.099 1.128 <0.001 3,209 0.798 -0.045 0.803 0.057
Never married 1,844 0.163 0.369 1,013 0.163 0.369
Married 7,626 0.671 0.47 2,058 0.671 0.47
Living together 539 0.047 0.212 35 0.047 0.212
Widowed 406 0.036 0.185 15 0.036 0.185
Divorced 578 0.051 0.219 45 0.051 0.219
not living together 369 0.033 0.177 43 0.033 0.177
Notes : Variables Test, N1, N2 and N3 take the value 1 for “yes” and 0 for “no”.
APPENDIX 7: COUNTRIES ATTENDED VPP PROGRAMME
Year Country Year Country Year Country Year Country
2009 Armenia
Guinea-Bissau
Haiti
Lao People's Democratic
Republic
Mozambique
Nicaragua
The former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia
Zambia
2010 Armenia
Cambodia
Comoros
Congo
Djibouti
Gambia
Haiti
Honduras
Indonesia
Lao People's Democratic
Republic
Liberia
Mongolia
Mozambique
Nicaragua
Niger
Philippines
The former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia
Togo
2011 Armenia
Cambodia
Central African Republic
Comoros
Congo
Côte d'Ivoire
Djibouti
Gambia
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Honduras
Lao People's
Democratic Republic
Liberia
Mali
Mongolia
Nicaragua
Niger
Philippines
Viet nam
2009-
2011
Armenia
Cambodia
Central African Republic
Comoros
Congo
Côte d'Ivoire
Djibouti
Gambia
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Haiti
Honduras
Indonesia
Lao People's Democratic
Republic
Liberia
Mali
Mongolia
Mozambique
Nicaragua
Zambia Niger
Philippines
The former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia
Togo
Viet Nam
Zambia
Total 8 18 20 25
Source: the Global Fund the Price
and Quality Reporting PQR (2015)
APPENDIX 8: SUPPLIER AND AGENTS
Supplier / Agent / Intermediary Freq. Percent
CHMP- Centrale Humanitaire Médico-Pharm 5 0.19
Central Medical Stores 550 21.33
Centrale d'Achat des Médicaments Essent 19 0.74
Clinton Foundation 14 0.54
Crown Agents Limited 10 0.39
Direct from manufacturer 1,063 41.22
The Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale
Zusammenarbeit(GIZ) (formerly: GTZ) 3 0.12
IDA Foundation 144 5.58
IMRES 3 0.12
Medical Export Group (MEG) 1 0.04
Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) 11 0.43
Other n/s 13 0.5
Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) 7 0.27
Partnership for Supply Chain Management 4 0.16
UN Population Fund 1 0.04
UNICEF Supply Division 291 11.28
VPP, through The Partnership for Supply Chain Management 426 16.52
WHO Procurement Department 1 0.04
i+ Solutions 13 0.5
Total 2,579 100
Source: the Global Fund PQR(2015).
Note: *This data is from 2007 to 2013 for Efavirenz.
APPENDIX 9: STRENGTH OF PROCURED EFAVIRENZ THROUGH VOLUNTARY POOLED PROCUREMENT( VPP)
Freq. Percent
100 mg 1 0.04
200 mg 628 24.35
30 ml 50 1.94
300 mg 2 0.08
50 mg 323 12.52
600 mg 1,575 61.07
Total 2,579 100
Source: the Global Fund the Price and Quality Reporting
PQR (2015)
*mg= milligram/*ml = millilitre
APPENDIX 10: COUNTRY EFFECTS ESTIMATED FROM THE REGRESSION USING LEADS AND LAGS FOR COMMON TREND IN THE TABLE 11
GLM
Ex works price Incoterms price
Coefficient(95% CI) P value Coefficient(95% CI) P value
Albania 0.248 (-0.282 : 0.777 ) 0.359 0.234 (-0.323 : 0.792 ) 0.410
Angola 0.033 (-0.49 : 0.556 ) 0.902 0.1 (-0.451 : 0.651 ) 0.721
Armenia 0.564 (-0.191 : 1.318 ) 0.143 0.631 (-0.163 : 1.426 ) 0.119
Azerbaijan 0.189 (-0.354 : 0.732 ) 0.494 0.267 (-0.305 : 0.839 ) 0.361
Bangladesh 0.15 (-0.364 : 0.664 ) 0.567 0.414 (-0.128 : 0.955 ) 0.134
Belarus 0.278 (-0.289 : 0.845 ) 0.337 0.357 (-0.24 : 0.954 ) 0.241
Benin 0.104 (-0.416 : 0.623 ) 0.695 0.286 (-0.26 : 0.832 ) 0.305
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 0.169 (-0.361 : 0.7 ) 0.531 0.304 (-0.255 : 0.863 ) 0.287
Brazil 0.036 (-0.537 : 0.608 ) 0.903 0.07 (-0.532 : 0.672 ) 0.820
Burkina Faso 0.178 (-0.339 : 0.694 ) 0.500 0.273 (-0.271 : 0.817 ) 0.326
Burundi -0.049 (-0.565 : 0.466 ) 0.852 0.088 (-0.455 : 0.631 ) 0.751
Cambodia 0.338 (-0.349 : 1.024 ) 0.335 0.414 (-0.308 : 1.135 ) 0.261
Cameroon 0.3 (-0.258 : 0.859 ) 0.292 0.281 (-0.307 : 0.868 ) 0.349
Central African Republic 0.493 (-0.003 : 0.99 ) 0.051 0.509 (-0.012 : 1.029 ) 0.055
Chad 0.558 (0.022 : 1.093 ) 0.041 0.693 (0.13 : 1.257 ) 0.016
Colombia 1.155 (0.564 : 1.747 ) 0.000 1.65 (1.026 : 2.274 ) 0.000
Comoros (the) 0.649 (-0.133 : 1.43 ) 0.104 0.773 (-0.049 : 1.595 ) 0.065
Cuba 0.08 (-0.57 : 0.731 ) 0.809 -0.032 (-0.717 : 0.654 ) 0.927
Cote d'Ivoire 0.353 (-0.182 : 0.889 ) 0.196 0.437 (-0.129 : 1.003 ) 0.130
Democratic Republic of the Congo 0.035 (-0.483 : 0.553 ) 0.895 0.08 (-0.466 : 0.625 ) 0.774
Denmark 0.384 (-0.432 : 1.201 ) 0.356 0.457 (-0.399 : 1.312 ) 0.295
Djibouti 0.673 (-0.013 : 1.359 ) 0.055 0.712 (-0.01 : 1.433 ) 0.053
Dominican Republic (the) 0.408 (-0.14 : 0.955 ) 0.145 0.431 (-0.145 : 1.008 ) 0.143
Ecuador 0.132 (-0.403 : 0.667 ) 0.629 0.137 (-0.427 : 0.7 ) 0.635
Egypt 0.219 (-0.314 : 0.752 ) 0.421 0.137 (-0.424 : 0.697 ) 0.632
El Salvador 0.043 (-0.496 : 0.583 ) 0.875 0.148 (-0.421 : 0.716 ) 0.611
Equatorial Guinea 0.356 (-0.312 : 1.024 ) 0.297 0.393 (-0.306 : 1.092 ) 0.271
Ethiopia -0.053 (-0.576 : 0.47 ) 0.843 -0.037 (-0.588 : 0.514 ) 0.896
Gambia 0.695 (-0.012 : 1.401 ) 0.054 0.651 (-0.093 : 1.394 ) 0.086
Ghana -0.024 (-0.547 : 0.499 ) 0.929 0.047 (-0.504 : 0.598 ) 0.867
Guatemala 0.064 (-0.461 : 0.59 ) 0.810 0.231 (-0.322 : 0.784 ) 0.413
Guinea 0.475 (-0.192 : 1.142 ) 0.163 0.544 (-0.156 : 1.244 ) 0.128
Guinea-Bissau 0.481 (-0.081 : 1.043 ) 0.093 0.493 (-0.098 : 1.084 ) 0.102
Haiti 0.603 (-0.028 : 1.233 ) 0.061 0.569 (-0.093 : 1.232 ) 0.092
Honduras 0.495 (-0.244 : 1.233 ) 0.189 0.505 (-0.272 : 1.282 ) 0.202
India -0.063 (-0.572 : 0.447 ) 0.809 0.074 (-0.462 : 0.611 ) 0.785
Indonesia 0.535 (-0.224 : 1.293 ) 0.167 0.498 (-0.3 : 1.295 ) 0.221
Iran (Islamic Republic of) 0.216 (-0.383 : 0.816 ) 0.480 0.234 (-0.397 : 0.865 ) 0.467
Iraq 0.39 (-0.216 : 0.996 ) 0.207 0.368 (-0.27 : 1.007 ) 0.258
Israel 0.158 (-0.577 : 0.894 ) 0.673 0.168 (-0.603 : 0.939 ) 0.669
Jamaica 0.241 (-0.291 : 0.773 ) 0.375 0.416 (-0.145 : 0.977 ) 0.146
Kenya -0.185 (-0.776 : 0.406 ) 0.540 -0.096 (-0.717 : 0.526 ) 0.763
Kyrgyzstan 0.924 (0.393 : 1.454 ) 0.001 1.054 (0.495 : 1.613 ) 0.000
Lao People's Democratic Republic 0.477 (-0.267 : 1.22 ) 0.209 0.482 (-0.3 : 1.264 ) 0.227
Lesotho -0.906 (-2.145 : 0.333 ) 0.152 -0.702 (-2.004 : 0.6 ) 0.291
Liberia 0.484 (-0.171 : 1.14 ) 0.148 0.401 (-0.288 : 1.09 ) 0.254
Libya 0.264 (-0.438 : 0.966 ) 0.461 0.226 (-0.513 : 0.964 ) 0.549
Madagascar 0.279 (-0.238 : 0.796 ) 0.290 0.385 (-0.159 : 0.93 ) 0.166
Malawi -0.329 (-1.16 : 0.501 ) 0.437 -0.382 (-1.255 : 0.492 ) 0.391
Mali 0.552 (-0.147 : 1.252 ) 0.122 0.593 (-0.142 : 1.329 ) 0.114
Mauritania 0.586 (0.06 : 1.112 ) 0.029 0.662 (0.108 : 1.216 ) 0.019
Mongolia 0.487 (-0.298 : 1.272 ) 0.224 0.44 (-0.385 : 1.265 ) 0.296
Morocco 0.442 (-0.122 : 1.007 ) 0.125 0.612 (0.018 : 1.206 ) 0.043
Mozambique 0.263 (-0.03 : 0.556 ) 0.079 0.167 (-0.141 : 0.475 ) 0.287
Myanmar 0.135 (-0.369 : 0.639 ) 0.599 0.188 (-0.342 : 0.719 ) 0.487
Namibia -0.509 (-1.426 : 0.408 ) 0.276 -0.447 (-1.411 : 0.517 ) 0.363
Nepal 0.167 (-0.338 : 0.673 ) 0.516 0.165 (-0.367 : 0.697 ) 0.544
Nicaragua 0.508 (-0.253 : 1.268 ) 0.191 0.553 (-0.247 : 1.353 ) 0.176
Niger 0.752 (0.037 : 1.467 ) 0.039 0.749 (-0.002 : 1.5 ) 0.051
Nigeria -0.047 (-0.578 : 0.484 ) 0.863 -0.043 (-0.602 : 0.515 ) 0.879
Pakistan 0.265 (-0.242 : 0.772 ) 0.306 0.232 (-0.302 : 0.766 ) 0.394
Papua New Guinea 0.41 (-0.123 : 0.944 ) 0.132 0.384 (-0.179 : 0.946 ) 0.182
Paraguay 0.187 (-0.335 : 0.708 ) 0.483 0.161 (-0.388 : 0.71 ) 0.566
Philippines 0.607 (-0.151 : 1.365 ) 0.117 0.596 (-0.201 : 1.393 ) 0.143
Republic of Moldova 0.25 (-0.262 : 0.761 ) 0.339 0.451 (-0.087 : 0.99 ) 0.100
Rwanda -0.159 (-0.677 : 0.359 ) 0.548 -0.128 (-0.674 : 0.418 ) 0.646
Senegal 0.46 (-0.057 : 0.976 ) 0.081 0.636 (0.091 : 1.18 ) 0.022
Sierra Leone -0.05 (-0.563 : 0.462 ) 0.847 0.082 (-0.457 : 0.622 ) 0.765
Somalia 0.114 (-0.403 : 0.632 ) 0.665 0.051 (-0.494 : 0.595 ) 0.855
South Africa 0.07 (-1.029 : 1.17 ) 0.900 0.235 (-0.921 : 1.391 ) 0.691
South Sudan -0.154 (-0.707 : 0.399 ) 0.585 -0.105 (-0.688 : 0.478 ) 0.724
Sri Lanka 0.098 (-0.427 : 0.624 ) 0.714 0.243 (-0.311 : 0.796 ) 0.390
Sudan 0.17 (-0.342 : 0.681 ) 0.515 0.162 (-0.376 : 0.701 ) 0.555
Suriname 0.172 (-0.396 : 0.741 ) 0.552 0.258 (-0.34 : 0.856 ) 0.397
Swaziland -0.79 (-2.232 : 0.652 ) 0.283 -0.749 (-2.264 : 0.767 ) 0.333
Switzerland 0.429 (-0.49 : 1.348 ) 0.360 0.479 (-0.484 : 1.442 ) 0.330
Tajikistan 0.187 (-0.318 : 0.692 ) 0.468 0.191 (-0.34 : 0.723 ) 0.481
Thailand 0.218 (-0.366 : 0.802 ) 0.465 0.276 (-0.339 : 0.891 ) 0.380
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 0.783 (-0.017 : 1.583 ) 0.055 0.784 (-0.057 : 1.624 ) 0.068
Timor-Leste 0.547 (-0.096 : 1.191 ) 0.096 0.472 (-0.207 : 1.151 ) 0.173
Togo 0.359 (-0.224 : 0.941 ) 0.228 0.465 (-0.149 : 1.078 ) 0.138
Uganda -0.11 (-0.71 : 0.491 ) 0.720 -0.071 (-0.702 : 0.561 ) 0.827
Ukraine 0.276 (-0.259 : 0.81 ) 0.312 0.447 (-0.116 : 1.01 ) 0.120
United States of America 0.289 (-0.629 : 1.207 ) 0.538 0.325 (-0.638 : 1.288 ) 0.508
Uzbekistan 0.185 (-0.342 : 0.711 ) 0.492 0.196 (-0.358 : 0.75 ) 0.488
Viet Nam 0.527 (-0.212 : 1.267 ) 0.162 0.438 (-0.339 : 1.215 ) 0.269
Yemen 0.139 (-0.373 : 0.651 ) 0.594 0.023 (-0.516 : 0.563 ) 0.932
Zambia (omitted) (omitted)
Zimbabwe -0.791 (-1.867 : 0.284 ) 0.149 -0.882 (-2.014 : 0.249 ) 0.126
Notes: 95% CI is in parentheses. 1) Zambia was omitted because of collinearity 2)Ex works price refers to the initial price at the manufacturer’s sites while
incoterms prices reflect which side, either seller or buyer, covers payment and risks (210). 3) Incoterms includes ex-works price and other 10 rules :
FCA( Free Carrier) ; CPT(Carriage Paid To) ; CIP (Carriage And Insurance Paid To) ; DAT (Delivered At Terminal) ; DAP (Delivered At Place) ; DDP
(Delivered Duty Paid) ; FAS (Free Alongside Ship) ; FOB (Free On Board) ; CFR ( Cost and Freight) ; CIF (Cost, Insurance and Freight) ; EXW( Ex works).
APPENDIX 114: THE RESULT OF GENERALIZED LINEAR MODEL (GLM) WITH COUNTRY FIXED EFFECTS IN THE TABLE 12
GLM GLM
Ex works price (95% CI) P value Incoterms price (95% CI) p value
Albania 0.109 (-0.425 : 0.643) 0.690 -0.102 (-0.82 : 0.617) 0.782
Angola -0.101 (-0.622 : 0.419) 0.703 -0.223 (-0.928 : 0.483) 0.536
Armenia 0.526 (0.042 : 1.009) 0.033 0.551 (0.024 : 1.077) 0.040
Azerbaijan 0.063 (-0.493 : 0.62) 0.824 -0.05 (-0.758 : 0.657) 0.889
Bangladesh 0.011 (-0.579 : 0.6) 0.971 0.078 (-0.652 : 0.809) 0.833
Belarus 0.137 (-0.441 : 0.715) 0.642 0.021 (-0.73 : 0.773) 0.956
Benin -0.034 (-0.55 : 0.482) 0.897 -0.047 (-0.782 : 0.688) 0.901
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 0.031 (-0.496 : 0.558) 0.907 -0.03 (-0.747 : 0.686) 0.934
Brazil -0.101 (-0.644 : 0.441) 0.715 -0.262 (-0.986 : 0.462) 0.479
Burkina Faso 0.04 (-0.494 : 0.574) 0.882 -0.06 (-0.775 : 0.655) 0.870
Burundi -0.187 (-0.704 : 0.331) 0.479 -0.241 (-0.961 : 0.479) 0.511
Cambodia 0.303 (-0.139 : 0.745) 0.179 0.332 (-0.146 : 0.809) 0.173
Cameroon 0.182 (-0.389 : 0.753) 0.533 -0.018 (-0.766 : 0.731) 0.963
Central African Republic 0.469 (0.125 : 0.814) 0.008 0.447 (0.096 : 0.799) 0.013
Chad 0.432 (-0.118 : 0.983) 0.124 0.384 (-0.366 : 1.134) 0.316
Colombia 1.01 (0.33 : 1.69) 0.004 1.313 (0.467 : 2.158) 0.002
Comoros (the) 0.609 (0.087 : 1.131) 0.022 0.679 (0.09 : 1.269) 0.024
Cuba -0.048 (-0.615 : 0.519) 0.868 -0.34 (-1.085 : 0.404) 0.370
Cote d'Ivoire 0.327 (0.004 : 0.65) 0.048 0.37 (0.022 : 0.718) 0.037
Democratic Republic of the Congo -0.092 (-0.605 : 0.421) 0.724 -0.233 (-0.935 : 0.47) 0.517
Denmark 0.246 (-0.432 : 0.925) 0.477 0.132 (-0.68 : 0.945) 0.750
Djibouti 0.64 (0.176 : 1.104) 0.007 0.636 (0.127 : 1.145) 0.014
Dominican Republic (the) 0.278 (-0.265 : 0.822) 0.316 0.118 (-0.602 : 0.838) 0.747
Ecuador -0.005 (-0.531 : 0.521) 0.986 -0.195 (-0.91 : 0.52) 0.593
Egypt 0.081 (-0.453 : 0.615) 0.766 -0.194 (-0.926 : 0.537) 0.602
El Salvador -0.092 (-0.617 : 0.434) 0.733 -0.182 (-0.886 : 0.521) 0.612
Equatorial Guinea 0.216 (-0.383 : 0.815) 0.480 0.062 (-0.696 : 0.819) 0.873
Ethiopia -0.188 (-0.716 : 0.339) 0.485 -0.364 (-1.078 : 0.35) 0.317
Gambia 0.659 (0.185 : 1.132) 0.006 0.57 (0.065 : 1.074) 0.027
Ghana -0.156 (-0.679 : 0.367) 0.559 -0.275 (-0.986 : 0.437) 0.449
Guatemala -0.072 (-0.603 : 0.46) 0.791 -0.1 (-0.823 : 0.624) 0.787
Guinea 0.442 (-0.014 : 0.898) 0.057 0.468 (-0.013 : 0.948) 0.056
Guinea-Bissau 0.462 (0.1 : 0.825) 0.012 0.447 (0.037 : 0.856) 0.032
Haiti 0.571 (0.165 : 0.977) 0.006 0.498 (0.059 : 0.937) 0.026
Honduras 0.465 (0.002 : 0.928) 0.049 0.427 (-0.071 : 0.924) 0.093
India -0.196 (-0.719 : 0.327) 0.462 -0.25 (-0.974 : 0.473) 0.498
Indonesia 0.495 (0.006 : 0.984) 0.047 0.402 (-0.116 : 0.921) 0.128
Iran (Islamic Republic of) 0.094 (-0.488 : 0.676) 0.751 -0.074 (-0.809 : 0.66) 0.842
Iraq 0.253 (-0.297 : 0.803) 0.367 0.037 (-0.695 : 0.768) 0.921
Israel 0.021 (-0.626 : 0.668) 0.950 -0.161 (-0.973 : 0.65) 0.697
Jamaica 0.104 (-0.445 : 0.653) 0.711 0.091 (-0.623 : 0.805) 0.802
Kenya -0.306 (-0.858 : 0.246) 0.278 -0.392 (-1.13 : 0.346) 0.298
Kyrgyzstan 0.789 (0.092 : 1.485) 0.026 0.722 (-0.178 : 1.622) 0.116
Lao People's Democratic Republic 0.44 (-0.031 : 0.911) 0.067 0.401 (-0.112 : 0.914) 0.125
Lesotho -0.98 (-1.83 : -0.131) 0.024 -0.899 (-1.917 : 0.12) 0.084
Liberia 0.451 (0.006 : 0.897) 0.047 0.321 (-0.149 : 0.792) 0.181
Libya 0.142 (-0.544 : 0.828) 0.685 -0.08 (-0.93 : 0.77) 0.854
Madagascar 0.141 (-0.418 : 0.7) 0.621 0.052 (-0.676 : 0.78) 0.889
Malawi -0.43 (-1.081 : 0.22) 0.195 -0.637 (-1.457 : 0.183) 0.128
Mali 0.515 (0.074 : 0.955) 0.022 0.503 (0.018 : 0.987) 0.042
Mauritania 0.452 (-0.318 : 1.222) 0.250 0.332 (-0.584 : 1.249) 0.477
Mongolia 0.451 (-0.053 : 0.954) 0.079 0.361 (-0.189 : 0.91) 0.198
Morocco 0.317 (-0.42 : 1.054) 0.399 0.299 (-0.536 : 1.134) 0.483
Mozambique 0.257 (0.079 : 0.434) 0.005 0.155 (-0.033 : 0.344) 0.106
Myanmar -0.002 (-0.516 : 0.512) 0.994 -0.144 (-0.847 : 0.559) 0.689
Namibia -0.606 (-1.291 : 0.079) 0.083 -0.688 (-1.551 : 0.174) 0.118
Nepal 0.028 (-0.493 : 0.549) 0.916 -0.172 (-0.89 : 0.547) 0.640
Nicaragua 0.471 (-0.017 : 0.959) 0.059 0.471 (-0.056 : 0.998) 0.080
Niger 0.722 (0.268 : 1.177) 0.002 0.673 (0.176 : 1.169) 0.008
Nigeria -0.172 (-0.691 : 0.347) 0.517 -0.35 (-1.058 : 0.358) 0.333
Pakistan 0.126 (-0.421 : 0.673) 0.651 -0.102 (-0.833 : 0.629) 0.784
Papua New Guinea 0.274 (-0.258 : 0.806) 0.313 0.05 (-0.662 : 0.762) 0.890
Paraguay 0.047 (-0.549 : 0.644) 0.876 -0.174 (-0.935 : 0.587) 0.654
Philippines 0.568 (0.075 : 1.06) 0.024 0.511 (-0.016 : 1.038) 0.057
Republic of Moldova 0.114 (-0.444 : 0.672) 0.690 0.121 (-0.611 : 0.853) 0.746
Rwanda -0.291 (-0.804 : 0.223) 0.267 -0.449 (-1.152 : 0.255) 0.212
Senegal 0.321 (-0.221 : 0.863) 0.246 0.299 (-0.406 : 1.004) 0.406
Sierra Leone -0.186 (-0.706 : 0.334) 0.483 -0.242 (-0.952 : 0.467) 0.503
Somalia -0.021 (-0.533 : 0.491) 0.937 -0.274 (-0.974 : 0.427) 0.444
South Africa -0.016 (-0.966 : 0.933) 0.973 0.018 (-1.101 : 1.136) 0.975
South Sudan -0.283 (-0.816 : 0.25) 0.298 -0.417 (-1.154 : 0.321) 0.268
Sri Lanka -0.039 (-0.575 : 0.496) 0.885 -0.089 (-0.803 : 0.624) 0.806
Sudan 0.032 (-0.485 : 0.549) 0.903 -0.172 (-0.877 : 0.534) 0.634
Suriname 0.039 (-0.512 : 0.589) 0.891 -0.067 (-0.81 : 0.677) 0.861
Swaziland -0.848 (-1.785 : 0.088) 0.076 -0.918 (-2.027 : 0.191) 0.105
Switzerland 0.289 (-0.453 : 1.03) 0.445 0.153 (-0.707 : 1.013) 0.727
Tajikistan 0.049 (-0.476 : 0.575) 0.854 -0.143 (-0.848 : 0.563) 0.692
Thailand 0.078 (-0.462 : 0.618) 0.777 -0.053 (-0.777 : 0.671) 0.885
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 0.744 (0.21 : 1.277) 0.006 0.701 (0.126 : 1.276) 0.017
Timor-Leste 0.43 (-0.118 : 0.978) 0.124 0.166 (-0.56 : 0.891) 0.655
Togo 0.33 (-0.04 : 0.7) 0.081 0.396 (-0.001 : 0.793) 0.051
Uganda -0.226 (-0.775 : 0.322) 0.418 -0.36 (-1.091 : 0.371) 0.334
Ukraine 0.142 (-0.433 : 0.717) 0.629 0.123 (-0.63 : 0.876) 0.749
United States of America 0.145 (-0.602 : 0.893) 0.703 -0.002 (-0.859 : 0.856) 0.997
Uzbekistan 0.048 (-0.479 : 0.575) 0.859 -0.131 (-0.844 : 0.582) 0.719
Viet Nam 0.49 (0.018 : 0.962) 0.042 0.345 (-0.176 : 0.866) 0.194
Yemen 0.008 (-0.516 : 0.532) 0.977 -0.3 (-1.012 : 0.412) 0.409
Zambia (omitted) (omitted)
Zimbabwe -0.853 (-1.6 : -0.107) 0.025 -1.063 (-1.98 : -0.145) 0.023
Notes: 95% CI is in parentheses. 1) Zambia was omitted because of collinearity 2)Ex works price refers to the initial price at the manufacturer’s sites
while incoterms prices reflect which side, either seller or buyer, covers payment and risks (210). 3) Incoterms includes ex-works price and other 10 rules :
FCA( Free Carrier) ; CPT(Carriage Paid To) ; CIP (Carriage And Insurance Paid To) ; DAT (Delivered At Terminal) ; DAP (Delivered At Place) ; DDP (Delivered
Duty Paid) ; FAS (Free Alongside Ship) ; FOB (Free On Board) ; CFR ( Cost and Freight) ; CIF (Cost, Insurance and Freight) ; EXW( Ex works).
APPENDIX 12 : INCOTERMS PRICE FOR VPP COUNTRIES AND NON VPP COUNTRIES
VPP countries from 2009 to
2013
Non VPP countries from 2009 to
2013
INCO Freq. Percent INCO Freq. Percent
CIF 1 1 CFR 6 2
CIP 13 14 CIF 47 15
DAP 1 1 CIP 86 27
DDP 3 3 CPT 4 1
EXW 63 68 DDP 15 5
FCA 12 13 DDU 12 4
EXW 48 15
FCA 78 25
FOB 19 6
Total 93 100 Total 315 100
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APPENDIX 13: CHAPTER 2- PUBLISHED PAPER (THIS PART HAS BEEN REMOVED DUE TO THE PERMISSION)
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APPENDIX 14: CHAPTER 3- PUBLISHED PAPER (THIS PART HAS BEEN REMOVED DUE TO THE PERMISSION)
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APPENDIX 15: CHAPTER 4- DECISION LETTER 

